Report to the Executive Board

The Proliferation of Border
and Security Walls Task Force

April 28, 2021

Task Force Members:
Josiah Heyman, Chair
Roberto Álvarez
Julie Peteet
Reinhard Bernbeck
Zahir Ahmed
Fabian Crespo

Jeff Martin, AAA Staff Liaison
Themes

➢ Connection between displacement and borders/walls
➢ Historical depth to structural means of inclusion/exclusion
➢ Walls include/exclude and define parameters of belonging and rights/privileges
➢ Violence – pervasive - overt and always a potential
➢ Climate change and its impacts are going to trigger massive flows north (We haven’t done much on this topic, but it is certainly on the horizon)
➢ North-South global divide – fortress north; global apartheid continues to take shape and adapt to changing circumstances
➢ Unevenness in mobilities
➢ Booming and lucrative industry around control over mobility from actual building of walls to surveillance technologies (i.e., vested interests are at work)
➢ Documentary regimes – as an accompaniment to borders and walls from identity cards to passports to possible, impending health passports.
➢ Environmental impact is serious
➢ Human Rights violations – mobility as a human right; the right to seek asylum
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INTRODUCTION

With the advent of Trump’s wall and its resulting effects on human lives and communities, walls on nation-state borders have become a prominent focus in the world today. At the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, globally there were only about 15 border/security walls in place or under construction. In contrast, today there are more than 70 walls, with additional ones being proposed. The longest physical border wall, still under construction, lies between India and Bangladesh (3,268 km).

Although human migration has been a fundamental characteristic of human history, walls are built and created primarily as barriers to control the mobility of people and commerce. This includes both physical (literal) walls, such as on the U.S.-Mexico border and Israel’s wall with Palestine, and the purely metaphorical barriers that restrict mobility such as illegality and nationalism. Both literal and metaphorical walls extend their influence within and beyond the markers/limits of nation state borders. Interior inspection points extend border control and walls creating geographically locked zones and increased surveillance. Advanced systems of technological surveillance (“virtual walls”) feed into direct human enforcement.

Walls not only separate geographic regions but also utilize geography in support of barriers and closure. The U.S.-Mexico border wall redirects human movement from urban zones to deserts increasing the danger and difficulty of crossing. Similarly, the Mediterranean Sea, the English Channel and the Torres Straits act as challenging barriers and murderous danger for refugees. These are important zones that recreate control and enforcement, as well as sequestering immigrants/refugees within nations. There thus is a complex continuum from the most obvious physical wall to subtle barriers for particular people and movements. The goal of our summary on “walls” is not definitional rigidity but eliciting resemblances, differences, and implications of various political means that inhibit mobility.

The complexity of walls both as built barriers, and markers of social-cultural-political differentiation reflect the changing but consistent momentum/continuum of control in the contemporary era of the territorial nation state and its related descendants (e.g., the European Union). We aim to understand walls as the materialization of social-cultural processes, in their channeling and controlling effects but also the limits of walls in the face of human action.
Wall Definitions

Walls are not limited to tall solid physical barriers. Indeed, many physical barriers have the form of fences or posts. There are, furthermore, important obstacles to entry and mobility that go beyond vertical walls, such as checkpoints on movement paths or belts of concentrated enforcement near boundaries. New detection technologies that identify moving people and conveyances, and target interdiction to them, sometimes called “virtual walls,” effectively constitute walls. Geographic obstacles, such as the Mediterranean Sea or dangerous deserts, may be used as dangerous barriers by design. This widens the definition of wall in informative ways. On the other hand, some metaphorical uses of “wall” in social analysis might be telling metaphors, but would stretch too far our focused task. We struggled with definitional boundaries, realizing that our use of “wall” involves a continuum, and came to the conclusion that at the core, walls are materialized forms of spatial-social exclusion, deployed unequally against some but not all people (Peteet 2017).

Political Dimensions

Walls are physical divisions and barriers of control that politicize space. The politics of space impel formal policy claims in which symbolic/political drivers, such as nativism, underlie and are the foundation of walls. The critical discrepancy between official formal policy claims/reasons for a supposed need of walls and the actual reality and results of walls, elucidate the political symbolism embedded in the ideology of walls. Understanding the nature of walls requires the analysis of symbolic politics and ideologies.

A notable feature of walls, we find, is their symbolization of an enclosed inside, distinguished from and protected against an uncontrolled or threatening, and thus “othered” outside, enacted precisely at territorial borders. A side effect is their “keeping in” of groups, and an enhanced self-perception of a collectivity inside a wall. Walls, then, often are implemented after periods of discourse of "crisis” for communities, mostly national, but also class-based for gated communities. Likewise, they are favored by a discourse of "threat” of normatively characterized collectives which easily devolves into racism. Once established, walls enhance perceived racial divisions. They are materialized racism. In recent decades, walls have occurred in a context of ideological shift from a "humanitarian approach” to mobility (e.g., rights of asylum) to a "securitization discourse." Securitization involves raising normal social processes and debated issues into fundamental threats to the survival of a society, typically (but misleadingly) identified with a bounded nation-state.
Border walls thus materialize foundational symbols that draw important social-cultural distinctions. They create a justification and methods for separation and closure. But walls do more than separate; they segregate individuals, communities, and regions. This is manifested in the exclusion of specific populations and the encasement and enclosing of others. The politics of space are especially evident through the massive intensification of control at checkpoints and ports of entry that bottleneck mobility. The militarized zones on both sides of walls and the use of force, weapons, and technology are transformations of symbolic politics into physical violence via an attempt to control space.

This includes the closure that concentrates refugees and asylum seekers into camps and settlements. These are prison-like spaces with no exit strategy for those seeking to cross. They produce and exacerbate the physical danger of attempted crossing and the actual crossing of a wall. The continuous and intended loss of life creates “death zones” that engender and necessitate an analysis in terms of biopolitics, perhaps better framed as the deathscapes of necropolitics.

New technologies, actual built and fantasized/imagined virtual walls, have been unsuccessful. Even physical walls contain passages that include checkpoints, ports of entry, and uncontrolled areas. No wall is a complete closure (with very few military exceptions). Despite the physical danger and material barriers, border wall crossers utilize strategies and informal/non-legal means to overcome these obstacles. People bypass or cut through walls. Corrupt regulators and officials provide entry of people and illegal products for personal profit. Smugglers tunnel under walls. Yet the cost and effects of such active responses culminate in the physical and social risk of the routes over and around walls.

**Mobility**

Mobility is a crucial concept that when addressing the current effects of walls expands the normal meaning of “the quality of being mobile” or the “ability to change one’s socioeconomic position.” Walls (on national borders) were created to monitor and allow the mobility (movement) of goods, finance, and other services, but to prevent the movement and entrance of specific groups of people. The concept of mobility has been usefully paired with enclosure, both processes operating simultaneously, and often unequally.

Mobility in anthropology is a basic human behavior that includes migration, but walls attempt to void this natural behavior. Mobility is a fundamental principle in our age,
especially in the free movement of capital and commodities over that of people. The freedom of movement in the world system is conditioned by the inequalities in which the wealthy wall-off the poor and powerless. Walls create unequal mobilities in which the privileged and functional (needed) workers pass. Those who are not allowed and cannot pass face the payment of large sums and debt to human smugglers, and often the physical risk of death and injury in dangerous routes around walls. Walls and more widely restrictions, checkpoints, and barriers have affected and cut off normal social-cultural ties across regional and local border communities that depend on local mobilities, often informal (not through official crossings).

During the late 20th and the 21st century we have witnessed a widespread global creation of walls that respond to a specific direction of population movements from south to north. This includes refugees and asylum seekers from sub-Saharan Africa into the European Union and Great Britain, and in the Americas from Central America via Mexico into the United States. Walls are thus important in symbolizing and enacting what has been called global apartheid. But walls can also be aimed at finer distinctions of race, ethnicity, and religion. Border separations, material and symbolic, seem associated in recent history with the intensification of global movement, communication, and economics. Perhaps they even are being reinforced by global pandemics. (This is not to ignore earlier historical connections and flows.) The relationship of the walling impulse and the globalization impulse is unclear, though gated walls permitting unequal mobilities and enclosures may be a useful tool of analysis.

**Ecology**

The environment is a complex web of stocks and flows, including in its human dimensions. Walls, as rigid barriers set in simple lines across the landscape, obstruct such flexible and complex connections. Their effects include disruption of econiches or truncation of breeding diversity for many moving animals; habitat destruction through wall building itself and broad zones of eradication of all plants and potential for wildlife; and rechanneling/blocking the flow of surface water. Their long-term effects may be different, such as the establishment of new econiches.

Walls destroy some sacred sites/landscapes or recreationally and aesthetically pleasurable sites, and obstruct access to others; they are culturally disruptive. Likewise, walls may obstruct or make more complex pathways needed to access a variety of valuable resources, habitats, and exchanges, worsening the human-environmental process or rendering it only
accessible to well-funded commercial actors. Walls may be a device for the legal or de facto enclosure and expropriation of property (e.g., landscapes, settlement sites, water).

Finally, we find an appealing but biologically unrealistic idea of protection against microorganisms to wall societies off against each other.

**Human Rights**

Mobility is a key component of the realization of human needs and goals (a capability). For meaningful consideration of how walls affect human rights, it is unhelpful to compare them with unbounded (wide open) movement. People cross borders in very distinct and limited ways. So walls affect human rights by limiting the capability to do those acts; enclosures set limits on capabilities for realization of basic and meaningful human goals and needs. The result can be structural violence (e.g., cannot gain a livelihood, cannot get asylum) and physical violence (including injuries and death falling from walls, and shootings by border guards/military of crossers, and use of mine fields). The belt of barriers and intensive enforcement zones cause serious harms, including death and injury when attempting to avoid enforcement and driving migrants to using expensive and sometimes abusive smuggling networks, with ramifying effects of debt. But the structural violence is wider yet, much in need of attention; there is a “domino effect” when people do not even try to move through walls and other barriers, despite fear of persecution and hope for a better life. They recognize that the path to such hopes is physically dangerous, and often lined with victimizers. The accumulation of waiting people in camps and towns in the midst of danger and extreme exploitation, and even the trips never taken, despite compelling reasons, need much more penetrating attention.

**Health**

Walls have important effects on health. The injuries from falls from walls and the shooting of people by border guards are obviously physically traumatic. Border enforcement barriers to mobility, such as people out of legal status being afraid or unable to pass inspection checkpoints, may seriously limit access to healthcare services. Walls often are thought politically to protect the people behind them from epidemic diseases. This thinking concerns physical walls as much as other barriers to movement. Yet this seems far too epidemiologically simple; physical and policy walls are permeable, though much more needs to be known.
Continuing Relevance of the Walls

This AAA initiative was begun during the 2017-2021 administration of Donald Trump, who emphasized the U.S.-Mexico border wall as a political symbol. But that wall long predated Trump, and transformations of the wall (such as a “virtual wall”) continue to be discussed. Broader barriers are ever-present in the region. Furthermore, walls and other barriers continue to be implemented in many other world regions. Our work continues to be relevant.

Contents of the Report

A notable quality of anthropology is its attention to deep human history, up to the present. We thus start with a chapter on ancient walls. We then turn to the most advanced technologies used (or proposed for) virtual walls. An important role of the social sciences is penetrating formal representations and justifications to reveal underlying processes. We think it is important to question the stated purposes of walls, and to propose alternative views, such as xenophobia and racism. As we have noted, walls are best understood as webs or belts of exclusionary barriers, but unequally, with differentiating passageways. We examine these points in a chapter on checkpoints. Walls slice through, and checkpoints obstruct and permit mobility through, borderlands societies. We then examine the impacts of walls on settled border communities, using the regional example of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands.

We offer a second take on the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, focusing on human rights issues for migrants passing through the walls of the borderlands. Consistent with the anthropological comparative method, we juxtapose the preceding chapter with one on human rights and the India-Bangladesh wall, and then draw out comparative conclusions. This raises the fundamental concern of border walls and human rights. Starting with our previous chapter on the India-Bangladesh border, we offer two chapters on human rights and border walls at the U.S.-Mexico border and the Israeli wall against the Palestinians. Interwoven with the human rights impacts are environmental impacts; several chapters address this topic in the India-Bangladesh, Israel-Palestine, and East and West German cases. A distinctive mark of anthropology being combining human biology and human cultures, our substantive chapters close with a history to the present of walls as attempted barriers to infectious diseases, through the present pandemic moment and beyond. We end with recommendations, what the AAA might do in concerning public knowledge, public policy, and research and scholarship about border walls.
Regional barriers have existed since the eighth millennium BCE in ancient Western Asia. However, the first long walls were not meant to exclude people or animals, but rather to corner wild herd animals in collective hunts. It was not until the late third millennium BCE that politically centralized regimes of sedentary populations erected walls against mobile human groups, accompanied by an early kind of "securitization" discourse, which polemicized the purported dangers and barbaric character of nomads.

With the major empires around the beginning of our era in China, Persia, and ancient Rome, the erection of walls became a widespread political means that fundamentally transformed geographies of power: from dominance of people to dominance of land. Characteristic of these imperialist walls was their structural adjustment to ecological and topographic conditions, both in terms of design as well as building materials. In all three cases mentioned above, typical “border zones” developed that were characterized by (1) an economic boom in the wake of a strong external military presence; (2) increasing intensity of trade through checkpoints and thus a mutual cultural development of hybridization on both sides of a supposedly rigid border; (3) an economization of border maintenance through the use of natural elements such as rivers, vegetation, dry river beds, etc.; and (4) the gradual disintegration of border regimes, primarily brought about by political and/or economic change.

The only wall system that was repeatedly remodeled over the centuries was in China, although particular historical constellations show little continuity. Can archaeology answer the question of whether the building of walls was a success story? The answer is no. There is no clear-cut answer to this frequently asked simplistic question because even in antiquity the interest in building a wall was not shared by all classes of a society, but rather was tied to power interests and military-economic calculations. The case of the Chinese wall shows that these constructions could be highly unpopular. Were walls at least able to produce the result intended by the powerful? The answer is, again, no. Instead of a division into two clearly separate topographies of “inside” and “outside,” hybrid border zones emerged that could extend far on both sides of a wall.
Ancient Border Walls and Regional Barriers

An overview of artificial landscape barriers in world history reveals numerous moments when small groups, whether village residents, city government, military officers, or empires saw the necessity to erect long walls. We will not provide a coherent overview of all such monuments but will select a few examples to highlight interpretive controversies that have a bearing on the present. A number of recent syntheses of landscape barriers point out the deep historical roots of political exclusion, and reduce such walls to protective defenses (Nunn 2009; Spring 2015; Frye 2018). As a rule, such studies focus on the connection between regional walls and political borders. This assumed connection applies to the oldest such walls in ancient western Asia, known from the late third millennium BCE in southern Iraq and western Syria. However, the origin of long walls that partition landscapes goes back even further in time.

In the western Asian steppe, walls were first built to facilitate the hunting of herd animals such as gazelle. The earliest of these structures date to around 7000 BCE (Betts and Burke 2015). The control of highly mobile animals by means of walls on the part of human populations became a model for later walls built in the same regions. As Horkheimer (1967) reasoned, the mastery over nature included at its core the mastery of humans over other humans.

The oldest known walls that separated people from each other date from the late third millennium BCE. Minna Silver (2016) interprets the simultaneous construction of these walls in Mesopotamia, Syria and the eastern fringes of Egypt as a result of a climate changing to more arid conditions. A nomadic way of life thereby became unsustainable, and the walls are an early manifestation of the encroachment of non-sedentary people upon irrigated agricultural land. They were a biopolitical means used against a multi-species community of humans and herd animals, primarily directed against the animals and only secondarily against the people who tended them. Even though these materialized boundaries were a demarcation separating different subsistence strategies, their construction was accompanied by a discourse of securitization that focused on rhetorics of external threat.

Chinese Walls

The following conjuncture of wall building starts in the late first millennium BCE, with the clearest evidence from ancient China. The earliest reliable archaeological and textual evidence for fragments of landscape barriers comes from the "Warring States Period" (475-221 BCE). The multiplication of various incoherent wall constructions during this time can be attributed to developments in governmentality. Ruling over others switched from relations of personal...
loyalty to bureaucratic mass administration and warfare changed from the use of chariots by a small aristocracy to large infantry units. Walls between small states had unintended side effects such as road tariffs and an early checkpoint system. We also observe a strengthening of political centralization and a general tendency to shun others. The standard assumption that a wall was needed to defend a sedentary population against mobile “barbarians” definitely did not apply to these times.

Around 220 BCE, the brutal emperor Qin Shihuang of the Qin dynasty integrated older wall stretches into a massive construction of "10,000 li" length (ca. 3000 miles) according to ancient texts. Material remains are sparsely preserved. This wall was largely the work of forced laborers. Despite its monumentality, it seems to have been mainly symbolic in nature. The emperor initially wanted to distinguish his empire from the political territory of the "Hu." Official discourse promoted the need for protection from a “barbaric” population beyond the wall. Another main strategic reason for Qin Shihuang’s wall was the desire to expand power into a new and sharply delimited region. As a consequence, he was not only able to extend his influence up to the wall but even beyond into a new “exterior” (Barfield 1989).

From the subsequent Han dynasty (206 BCE - 9 CE) to the Ming rulers (14th to 17th centuries CE), various sections of walls were built in the northern confines of the Chinese state. Building materials and orientation toward natural features (e.g., rivers, mountains ridges) varied according to region and time. In contrast to other political regimes that built walls, the Chinese variant is remarkable for the extremely long-term efforts involved in its construction and maintenance. This has repeatedly led to attempts at a unified explanation. Past understandings of the wall(s) play an important role in today’s historiography. Owen Lattimore’s (1940) highly influential Inner Asian Frontiers of China sees the ecological conditions in the north and northeast of China as the main reason for two different lifeways: pastoral nomadism in the Mongolian north and settled agriculture in the plains of China in the south. However, Lattimore did not simply read into the walls a defense function of sedentary populations against nomads. He saw in them a double strategy of preventing attacks and safeguarding sovereignty "to keep the outsiders from getting in, but [also] to prevent the insiders from getting out" (Lattimore 1940: 240). The use of the term "frontier," ultimately borrowed from Turner's (1920) problematic account of U.S. history, reveals that Lattimore considered the linear walls as part of a borderland zone.
This view of a radical difference between the ecological, economic, and political forms of organization on both sides of the Chinese walls is nowadays heavily criticized as ahistorical and generalizing (Rogers 2012; Di Cosmo 2002). Archaeology has recently contributed important data from the region north of the Great Wall(s), indicating that the subsistence of the semi-sedentary people was diverse and included agriculture. Claims that horse-mounted pastoralist groups depended for their existence on raiding, trade, or some other forms of interaction with sedentary (Chinese) people in the south are understood as oversimplified and normative.

Two recent studies about a wall stretch on the Ordos plateau use similar methods to investigate the relationship between climate change and wall construction. While the first sees in long-term maladaptive cultivation practices of farmers the reason for later desertification processes (Rost, Böhner, and Pörtge 2003), the second study attributes the wall's abandonment in the Ming period solely to a climatic dry spell (Cui et al 2017).

"Chinese walls" not only have a long history of construction, maintenance, and renovation. They make their way into political thinking, both in the past and the present. However, despite books, films, and historical research on the “Great Wall,” two topics remain under-researched. First, periods of neglect and abandonment of the wall or some of its sections need more investigation. Second, the drudgery involved in these monstrous constructions, drawing on dozens of generations of laborers and soldiers, must have been considerable. Research into the organization of construction, the origin of raw materials, the means of transport, the provisioning of laborers is mostly lacking, even though exploitation was apparently so extreme in many periods that it is sedimented as collective memory in one of the four main Chinese legends, “Lady Meng Jiang” (Lee 2005). The wife of a laborer conscripted to work on the wall sets out to bring him warm clothes when winter starts, only to find out that he has already died from exhaustion and is buried under the wall. Her tears make the wall crumble and reveal his bones. Collective memory was only turned to the positive—and into a different myth—when it served as a symbol against Japanese occupation, adopted by Mao who saw himself as a descendant of ancient rulers and finally when the wall was touristified (Langerbein 2009). Waldron (1990) shows in detail the active role of western historiography in the process. Today, the invention of a “Great Wall” has anchored an ideologically inflated tourist attraction in international imagination.
Rome and the Limes

In the first centuries of our era, politically induced construction of walls reached a global peak. Parallel to those of the Chinese Han Empire and located at the other end of the Silk Road, Rome built a similarly complex boundary system. “Limes” research, especially in central Europe, has a history of well over 100 years. Whittaker (2000) vividly demonstrates how much ideas of the 19th and 20th centuries about national and colonial borders are interwoven with reconstructions of the limits of the Roman Empire. This not only includes intra-European national borders but in particular the false parallelization of the *limes* with the northwestern border of British India that Lord Curzon described in a well-known lecture in 1907 as a "scientific frontier."

The linear borders of Rome’s power only emerged in the imperial period (27 BCE - 284 CE). Barriers of various kinds stretched from North Africa via the eastern Levant and the Taurus mountains in present-day Turkey to the lower Danube and up to the so-called Upper Germanic-Raetian Limes. The northernmost element is Hadrian's Wall, a stone construction with watchtowers in northern England. The *limes* consisted partly of log-built watchtowers and a palisade wall, partly of a simple ditch and small forts. Other stretches consisted of a series of castles along a military highway. This was no materially consistent system for any limitation of the Roman Empire - *limes* could designate paths that ran through a border area, a peripheral province, a frontier zone (Mattingly 1992), or a linear demarcation, depending on historical and regional context (Wheeler 1993).

Today’s perception of the borders of the Roman empire remains mostly that of a huge, homogeneous project. This impression of uniformity has been furthered by the declaration of parts of the *limes* as a transnational World Heritage Site. An influential interpretation of such long-term Roman planning, a "grand strategy," was penned by the U.S. military adviser Edward Luttwak (1976). He assumed three phases of Roman imperial policy, an expansionary one, followed by an exclusionary, supposedly "scientific borderline" that saw its beginning with the emperor Vespasian around 70 CE. Finally, the third century BCE saw a switch to “defense-in-depth,” which did not explicitly keep Rome's enemies out, but instead accepted their temporary invasions in peripheral provinces to attract and integrate them into the empire.

This synthesis was criticized as unrealistic. Historians emphasized that individual sections of the *limes* had been built and expanded at different times, that the location of the *limes* was less precise than we may think today, and that speeches and inscriptions give no hint of strategic
planning within the Roman defense apparatus (Mann 1979). This assessment is followed by most archaeologists and historians (see Whittaker 2004: 28–49).

Traditionally, the Roman border was thought to have been obliterated during an attack in the year 260 CE. Heeren (2016: 186-188) demonstrates that the idée fixe of the “fall of the limes” was derived from late 18th century excavations and their undue insertion in pre-existing historical narratives in an 1823 publication.

Recent approaches to ancient borders try to understand them from the perspective of a central political power, almost always adopting the gaze of rulers and administrators. This stance is visible in recent research on variable spatial “ontologies” or “world views” as a precondition for the interpretation of imperial landscape barriers of both the Roman empire (Graham 2006; Whittaker 2004) and the Chinese empires (Bol 2007; Tackett 2008).

In a few cases, anthropologically oriented archaeology has shown its potential to contribute other kinds of perspectives, such as the spread of Mediterranean culinary idiosyncrasies to northern Europe due to military dislocations. Melons and olives did not grow on the Thames, but people’s moves because of the limes created a “transcultural space” with fundamental changes in quotidian life (Stoll 2016).

The limes, like the “Great Wall,” have been turned into a World Heritage Site. It is a monument of division that runs through several modern European countries from the Netherlands to Romania. The line of forts and fences partially supports nationalist ideologies (Hanscam 2017). It also is promoted as a monument that unites Europe (Hingley 2018): former military borders within today’s Europe can be crossed freely, a strong symbol for changing times.

The Sasanian Empire and the Caspian Walls

Located geographically between the Roman empire and China, the first centuries CE saw the rise of the Sasanian dynasty in Persia. The linguist János Harmatta takes an approach similar to Luttwak and presupposes a consistent strategy of the Sasanian Empire whose walls were built to protect the most developed agricultural systems of the ancient world against dangerous, horse-riding nomads (Harmatta 1996: 84). Recent archaeological work (Sauer et al. 2013) has significantly improved our previously vague knowledge. The northeastern walls from the fifth and th centuries consist of a wall, a line of forts, a ditch, and topographic planning along the Gorgan river. Estimates based on the forts yield a potential of tens of thousands of border guards, with equally high numbers in larger fortresses in the interior (Sauer et al. 2013: 19-20).
Like the Romans, the Sasanian architects made use of the topography east and west of the Caspian Sea, including the Caucasus, the western foothills of the Kopet Dag and the Alborz mountains. Canals and other hydraulic installations formed part of some walls as well. The walls were laid out in such a way as to block the north-south traffic through the plains. Not all researchers consider these walls to be defense lines. Haug (2019) sees them in conjunction with interpretations of the Chinese Walls as an effort to secure newly conquered areas, the populations of which were to be kept inside the empire.

**Russian Abatis lines**

Chinese and Sasanian walls have been interpreted as defenses against aggressive groups of horse-mounted nomads. This line of reasoning can also be found for a landscape barrier that separated the Principality of Moscow from the Khanate of the Golden Horde and groups of Tatars to the south and east. Here, the construction of an impenetrable separation line did not consist of architectural elements but of half-hewn tree tips that were turned toward the presumptive enemy. Strips of land with such trees were often several hundred meters wide. Where suitable, swamps and forests were also used, the latter guarded and regularly trimmed for impenetrability (Ponomarenko 1994). In some regions, ramparts were added and the devices staggered in parallel strips (Davies 2007). At the time of its greatest length in the middle of the 16th century, the *abatis* line stretched over hundreds of miles and was regularly reinforced by small wooden fortresses, called *ostrogs*, as well as larger ones (*kremli*). Although this bio-wall was built to protect against the highly mobile Tatars, over time its function became an enclosing one. With the expansion of the tsar’s territory under Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century, the rural population was prevented from escaping the increasingly repressive state power in the direction of the so-called Wild Field in the lower reaches of the Pontic steppes (Weiner 2009: 278-280). As opposed to the *limes* and Chinese wall, the last remains of these impenetrable forest areas near Tula were removed by the Stalin regime.

**Summary**

This brief overview of past landscape barriers reveals problems with comparative approaches: functions, construction, location, and abandonment of ancient walls are complex and depend on historical circumstances. An intensification of infrastructural projects, such as roads, farmsteads, and garrisons, particularly in borderlands, could have economic effects. The stationing of huge numbers of soldiers in imperial border zones of the Sasanian, Roman and
Chinese empires sometimes resulted in a local economic boom. In the event, differences emerged that increased the attraction of the inner borderlands in comparison to territories “outside” the walls. According to recent archaeological research, such borderland economies were not particularly resilient, either in an ecologic or an economic sense.

Judgment about the military success or failure of linear barriers is mostly in the eyes of the beholder. Eventually, all walls collapse or are demolished and therefore will be a failure – as is the case for all political regimes, monuments and other projects that are meant to last for eternity. If anything, the usefulness of walls can be measured economically: were there alternatives that would have been cheaper? What would have been the consequences, and for whom? These are not futile questions. The past does not only consist of the acts of more or less powerful rulers and their supporters, but also of the unrealized dreams and desires of those whose voices are lost to us today. Archaeologists and students of material culture have pursued such questions for more recent cases as well (Baker 2015; de Léon 2015; McAttackney and McGuire 2020).

Comparative treatises often display undue reductionism in order to convey one fundamental message about walls to a large audience. Peter Spring’s (2015) and David Frye’s (2018) books fall prey to this danger, the first reducing barriers to a conflict between settled and nomadic groups, the second to a symbol of civilization versus barbarism. In addition, they both naturalize the building of walls through their insistence on the high frequency of their construction throughout history. But the main simplifier in present-day imaginations is the touristification of walls. The declaration of the Chinese wall, the Roman *limes*, or any other such barrier as a heritage site dehistoricizes the existence of strict border systems against Others and naturalizes present-day walls. Walls as heritage sites support imaginations of coherent collectives with sharply defined spatial limits. Heritagization of walls underscores a deceptive homogeneity of a past that was in fact multifarious. It is accompanied by assumptions of stark differences between groups who lived on opposite sides of past walls, instilling the perception of categorical differences between people.

Past empires developed similar ideological tendencies. Many generations of Chinese officials thought of themselves as *hua* or civilized, and the other as *yi* or barbarian (Waldron 1990: 59). One goal of these ideological constructions was and is to enforce internal unity and a sharp gradient towards the exterior, a *spatiality of defamation*.
**Summary: Virtual Walls**

**Josiah Heyman**

A virtual wall refers to electronic and optical surveillance over a borderline or zone. It may be combined with physical barriers, or just used as input to an interdiction force. Without a connected interdiction force, the virtual surveillance system is nothing more than a source of information to the state apparatus. Indeed, border enforcement zones already are heavily saturated with passive but powerful detection technologies, devices used by humans. But the language of virtual walls shifts the volition and capacity to act to technologies. The extent to which artificial intelligence can actually make decisions to initiate action is debated, especially with noisy, real world data. But there is an important point here beyond questions of engineering and computer science. The common rhetoric of “virtual walls,” both in production and reception, removes human action from the scene—the computers do it—and possibly reduces the sense of (but not the reality) responsibility for an ethically controversial issue.

**Virtual walls**

Physical barriers, including walls, without sensors or cameras, are passive obstacles. They may dissuade some casual crossers, but empirical analysis has shown that long-distance migrants persistently attempt to cross heavily enforced borders (Bean et al. 1994; Cornelius and Lewis 2007), though detection, arrest, and punishment as disincentives are a different, still-debated matter (Martínez, Slack, and Martínez-Schuldt 2018). Ieva Jusionyte’s (2018) ethnography of first responders at the U.S. border wall with Mexico indicates that one physical effect of a high but passive barrier is to raise the chance of injury from falls, while increasing the value of, and thus the smugglers’ price for, ladders, holes in walls, and the like. Josiah Heyman’s (1995) and Robert Lee Maril’s (2004) ethnographies with U.S. Border Patrol agents report that agents view sensors and, to a lesser extent, cameras with human operators as valuable secondary devices aiding border interdiction, but acting on such surveillance fundamentally depends on human policing initiative and coercive force. Sensors and cameras, of course, are core technologies of would-be virtual walls; and their uses and limits inform us about the realities of the imagined virtual regime. Agents in the field, in particular when they feel free of political controls, also argue that walls and other obstacles simply slow down or reroute transit, which may aid human border policing (especially where
crossers can disappear in urban landscapes or thick vegetation quickly), but does not replace human policing. The point of these real-world operational features of physical walls is that virtual walls will have the same uses and limits. Obstacles are passive; surveillance is informative, but also fundamentally passive. Human coercive policing is unavoidable, until we invent violent autonomous mobile robots.

Physical walls, then, are not magic solutions to deeply entrenched social-political phenomena. Virtual walls are put forward as alternative, improved magic solutions. In fact, actually existing virtual walls to our knowledge have not functioned at all or only in very limited sites and roles. Here we mean advanced remote detection systems that process some combination of satellite, drone, fixed camera (light and heat), local and over-the-horizon radar, and movement sensor data, and that assign interpretations and responses on the basis of artificial intelligence. (Advanced detection technologies that are watched and interpreted by humans are widespread and important, often in a role that is adjunct to stupid, passive barriers like walls.) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has made two major, expensive attempts at a virtual wall. Both have failed (Maril 2012). The core flaw so far appears to be that real-world surveillance data are so noisy that computer algorithms frequently provide misleading assignments to human enforcers (GAO 2011). The second, more advanced attempt at a U.S. virtual wall often assigned officers to interdict cattle or dust storms. But, as noted at the beginning, our interest as anthropologists is not in critiquing the engineering; indeed, we can play with the idea that someday such systems will work nearly as designed. The lesson so far, however, is that the virtual wall is an imagined goal that continually comes back from the operational dead, perhaps for social-political reasons.

First, powerful private and geopolitical interests benefit from virtual wall initiatives (Miller 2017). Robert Lee Maril (2012) has traced two U.S. programs. American Shield was simply a well-connected fraud that attempted nothing. SBInet (Secure Border Initiative Network) was corrupt in the more sophisticated manner of well-connected corporations (Boeing) getting lucrative contracts with highly funded bureaucracies, and exchanging key personnel; this was the program just mentioned that actually built a few surveillance units linked to computers that interdicted cattle. Interestingly, SBInet principally contracted out for conventional static construction of border walls. Since then, a number of sophisticated subsystems have been developed, notably by Israeli contractor Elbit Systems (Parrish 2019; Boyce et al. n.d.), but
these remain information-gathering technologies (e.g., very precise cameras with adaptive optics), not actually smart virtual walls.

Second, the virtual wall appeals to a specific concept (“imaginary”) of the bounded nation-state (Heyman 2012). All threats come from outside; they have no involvement with the interior society (the reality is, of course, vastly more complex). That interior society is pure and perfect, including an imaginary racial purity. But it is threatened and needs to be protected.¹ It is no accident that the relevant U.S. agency is the Department of Homeland Security, and the border agency is Customs and Border Protection. The wall, then, whether a physical barrier or a virtual wall, is a materialization of (1) division, outsiders versus insiders; and (2) protection of the interior. The virtual wall appeals to the imagination—especially one that seeks an all powerful, technological force to seal off the home from outside threats. It appears to be much more powerful than a static, crude edifice, even if so far it is not. Perhaps this is why it reoccurs in the political imagination.

Third, the virtual wall addresses—better said, appears to address—a basic contradiction in the perfect protection concept (drawing here on Carrier and Miller’s [1998] general concept of virtualism as imagined action in social life). Borders cut across or give rise to relationships, social, economic, and so forth (see Alvarez chapter). At various levels, from elite to mass, affinity and cooperation across borders is important. Making these relationships possible are gateways or ports, discussed elsewhere (Heyman).² Gateways finesse the contradiction between actual obstacles and profound connections and relationships. Virtual walls do also. An invisible, impalpable electronic wall would be a way to control borders outside these legitimate entry/exit points without a visible symbol of division between sides and rejection of the others. That is a common stance taken by U.S.-side border elites

¹ This just raises the question, under what circumstances does such a concept of fragile and threatened, but also masterfully powerful state rise in political prominence (Heyman 2012).
² States avidly seek to “know” movement of people and material objects through gateways (especially see Heyman 2009b), via technologies such as biometric identity documents, radio-frequency identification cards, license plate readers, non-intrusive scanners, dogs, cameras, and linked to all this, databases; as before, this must bring into play human action on information, such as go or no go, questioning, seizure, etc. Such sites functionally operate much more effectively than what was described above, because crossers deliberately present themselves or their items for inspection, in controlled bottlenecks, but notably even then, fail at impressive rates (e.g., most contraband drugs enter the United States under inspection, at ports of entry). Such surveillance at gateways can be considered a form of virtual border, but transcends the bounds of this inquiry, since it is simultaneously permissive and obstructive, by contrast with walls. It desperately needs more research.
(business, politics) as an alternative to the large physical wall, which is seen as insulting to Mexico, their main economic partner. Perhaps this is a real solution to a political dilemma, but currently it is only an imaginary solution.

Border surveillance (of which a fully virtual wall is an extreme) may be socially unequal. Border region residents and border crossers both may be disproportionately members of ethnic, religious, or regional minorities. They are thus disproportionately watched (e.g., electronic entry/exit records, facial recognition, aerial surveillance, motion sensors); not only is this an intrusion into privacy but increased scrutiny means increased chances of being caught in a legal violation (Pallitto and Heyman 2008, Heyman 1999, 2009a). Most responses to border technologies and the virtual wall—including critical ones—focus on technology, security studies, and individual privacy; anthropology and related inquiries should focus on the unequal application and consequences, often racialized, of such practices.³

³ Josiah Heyman is currently working on this topic; also see Boyce et al., n.d.
Summary: Border Walls – Open and Hidden Agendas
Josiah Heyman

Border walls, and related infrastructure (such as ports of entry, checkpoints, and surveillance systems) should be understood as political acts, in its wider meaning. (1) Walls are material means of exclusion; (2) walls are material means of enclosure; (3) each of those are situated in specific social and cultural contexts in particular places and times, as well as (4) broader historical tendencies in emphasizing either enclosure or exclusion. Enclosing and excluding walls are in recent history characteristically associated with the bounded nation-state, but this is certainly not the only time in history when walls or other kinds of boundary interdiction has been applied. In these political contexts, walls have overt, formal rationales. Anthropology and other social sciences and history also show that they have unstated goals and effects which are essential in their social analysis. These claims open two sorts of questions. First, how do walls perform in terms of their ostensible policy justifications (although anthropologists tend to be skeptical about formal policy analysis, we put our policy effectiveness at risk by ignoring this level). Second, what do we learn from critically reading overt justifications of walls about the dominant power ideas (fears and aspirations) of the social order and various counter projects.

Border Walls: Open and Hidden Agendas

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Broadly, we can typologize walls and their relatives as keeping people in and/or keeping people out. Besides people, we also can consider goods and other living beings. The classic example of a wall openly aiming to keep people in is the Berlin Wall, although in fact many people bypassed it to get out of East Germany. This was part of a wider policy, never perfect, of Communist and other authoritarian states to limit emigration and immobilize internal migration. More needs to be learned about realities of mobility in internally restrictive societies, and thus covert effects such as social and political inequality and control.
As Bernbeck suggests in our report, there was an older tendency for pre-capitalist polities, where direct producers are a crucial resource, to try to wall populations in. In the other direction, there were historical instances where walls were used to keep out would-be immigrants, such as poor people (“beggars”) coming into walled cities. Still, the advent of infrastructure to keep people out—more precisely, discussed below, to register and regulate movement inward, including keeping some people out—seems mainly to have accompanied the vast expansion of long distance labor migration under capitalism in the nineteenth century (especially the end), continuing into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (CE) (McKeown 2011). Across the twentieth century, this exclusionary-to-regulatory tendency existed side-by-side with the entrapment agenda of authoritarian states, but the collapse or drastic transformation of the communist world (with small exceptions) has made border wall agendas seemingly only about outward exclusion, especially exclusion of migrants. It is important to think more widely.

These enclosing and excluding walls are in recent history characteristically associated with the bounded nation-state, but this is certainly not the only time in history when walls or other kinds of boundary interdiction has been applied. Trying to understand processes generating territorial closure in various social formations requires much more work. Looking at the recent territorial nation-state case, the bounding processes accompany the rise of particular social-spatial ideas discussed below, material practices such as potentially violent law enforcement, and the emergence of a “state of exception” at each territory’s outer limits when states claim absolute sovereignty over crossing persons and commodities (a claim that is intensely disputed and often defied) (Agamben 1998; Díaz-Barriga and Dorsey 2020). The state of exception puts people at legal and often physical risk when crossing (Jusionyte 2018). Wall injuries and deaths going both outward and inward are an expression of this regime. We can summarize this framework as follows: (1) walls as material means of exclusion; (2) walls as material means of enclosure; and (3) the social and cultural contexts of each in particular places and times, as well as (4) broader historical tendencies in which direction of control is emphasized.

Walls thus are a practical and symbolic effort at imposing spatial order on a mobile world (Heyman 2012). Almost always an official justification is offered for walls. That justification generally is proffered in terms of protection or well-being of populations (the claim of Foucauldian biopower), whether economy, health, political order, lawfulness, safety, ethnic
ordering, or others. These claims open two sorts of questions. First, how do walls perform in terms of their ostensible policy justifications (although anthropologists tend to be skeptical about formal policy analysis, we put our policy effectiveness at risk by ignoring this level). Second, what do we learn from critically reading overt justifications of walls about the dominant power ideas (fears and aspirations) of the social order and various counterprojects. A wall, for example, may aspire to reinforce ethnonational distinctions in the face of incompleteness and transformation.

But examining overt justifications, even critically, is insufficient. There are unstated or obscurely stated agendas to walls, often very important in their politics and implementation (Heyman 2012). The tools of social science are well suited for their diagnosis. For example, Israeli walls imposed on the Palestinians are openly justified in two ways: the enclosure and transfer of territory within an expansive racist-demographic vision of the future; and protection from external threats (setting aside the reality of this claim). But covertly Israeli walls also fragment and shatter Palestinian society and potential polity, deprive them of resources, rendering them more dependent and proletarian, and reinforce long-standing patterns of dependent labor commuting to Israel (Peteet 2017). Gates in walls (checkpoints in the local terminology), a functional necessity of most or all walls discussed below, also serve as a disciplinary device through the administration of admission or denial. Finally, in this overt/covert framework it is always important to remember that state projects are subject to incompleteness and failure, avoidance and resistance, and paradoxical or perverse outcomes (Heyman 1999).

We can summarize what is just written as: (1) overt rationales of walls (a) assessment of success in terms of those goals; (b) analysis of why those goals in a place and time; (2) hidden or incompletely stated goals including (a) analysis of why those agendas in a place and time; and (3) incompleteness of various kinds, and why they occur.

Walls are not just ideas, discourses, or verbalizations; they unquestionably are massive material projects (e.g., investments of knowledge, resources, and labor) with material consequences (e.g., forcing people to abandon traditional routes and crossing points). Nevertheless, many analyses find that walls are materializations of symbolic political projects. They visibly represent and enact political imaginaries, such as a clear “nation” in a clear “territorial state,” in the face of change, ambiguity, interrelationships, and flows. A wall
at a particular place enacts imaginaries of a specific kind. The wall materializes an imaginary unitary “inside.” In contrast—and this is essential to the material intention of building a wall—it keeps out (ostensibly) the “outside.” The inside is imagined as needing protection, and being protected. All threats are imagined as coming from outside. The inside is absolved of all involvement and responsibility for constructed “issues.” For example, labor and family migrants are transgressors from outside, not people involved with kin/coethnic networks, employer recruitment, and family reunification. Likewise, asylum-seekers are unbidden migrants, seeking welfare, and not the messy aftermath of colonialism, foreign wars and interventions, and drug demand (via production and transshipment violence). Walls deny relationships and responsibility; walls simplify complexity; and walls enact and reinforce hypocrisy (Heyman 2017).

As this account indicates, the wall idea of bounded states and societies is impossible. The intense, often unequal exchanges central to capitalism span such borders (which indeed help create and reproduce the inequalities). Smaller commerce likewise cuts across borders; there are hundreds of goods and services that are specialized or cheaper on one side of a border or another (Heyman and Ribas-Mateos 2019). And human relationships likewise defy borders, both because borders (including walls) often cross existing human geographies, and because interactions are actually encouraged by borders, resulting in bonds and communities (Alvárez 2012). Walls, then, rarely (perhaps never) are absolute closures. Rather, they have passageways (called gates, checkpoints, or ports of entry). The absolute ideas of walls ignore such passageways. Yet they are vital to border communities, and the wider society.

As phenomena of vast importance, passageways are poorly studied. Here, walls are our central agenda, so passageways merit only a few, brief remarks. Passageways may be official, or unofficial. Unofficial passages defy state surveillance. (Often unofficial passageways predate the imposition or strengthening of state power at borders, but sometimes they are cut into fences and walls.) As a result, unofficial passageways are precisely the target of much wall reinforcement and extension; and military-police operations often aim precisely at defiant passageways. The passageways themselves are inherently contradictory. Most travelers and goods are legitimate—indeed, desired—but intermixed are various kinds of state-labeled contraband and even putative threats. Walls are meant to be absolute stops. Passageways are unclear in their intention, to both permit (often to register) and to stop. The ideal passageway is an omniscient and efficient sorting filter. Of course, this rarely (never)
happens. Part of the political appeal of walls and other border closures is that they are or should be simple; passageways are messy. Their performance enacts important inequalities of ethno-race, class, and gender-sexuality; they express such relations of power, and because of their importance, reproduce them (Heyman 2004).
Summary: Checkpoints
Julie Peteet

Introduction
If mobility occupies a central place in human history, obstacles to it in the form of low- and hi-tech mechanisms to control, monitor, and regulate it have been an integral part of that history. Currently, a discernable global security-industry complex governs the unfolding of human mobility. Mobilities are vastly unequal as certain people and forms of mobility are criminalized across the globe. Indeed, “Mobility is a key axis of social inequality” (Heyman and Symons 2012:543). Saskia Sassen (2014) has written persuasively of the impulses, predatory formations, and expulsions which underlie current spatial arrangements and the scope of displacement around the globe. Ronen Shamir (2005) astutely brings together a global system of closure and containment derived from a “paradigm of suspicion.” Heyman (2004: 303-304) writes of a globalized world “not of open terrain, but a jigsaw puzzle of unequal spaces with checkpoints on passageways between them.” This section explores the literature on the checkpoint. With checkpoints, the right to mobility becomes twisted into a privilege for some and a contingent, monitored, and controlled system of encumbrances and violence for others.

As anthropology took up the study of human mobility, checkpoints became sites for ethnographic research. Alongside Rema Hamammi’s (2004) initial work on checkpoints in Palestine, Pradeep Jeganathan’s chapter on Sri Lanka is probably the first anthropological account of checkpoints. He constitutes checkpoints as an “anthropological object” whose locations in a state are “cartographies of anticipated violence” (2004:69, 68). And, he points out, identities are at the core of what checkpoints are meant to accomplish: verify identities and determine action. Tawil-Souri dubbed the largest checkpoint in Palestine “‘anthropological space’ that is also a ‘non-place’ – in other words, deeply contradictory” (2011:5). Hammami’s seminal article on checkpoints in Palestine captured a key contradiction: intended to separate people, their operation presents a potential for interaction (2019: S87).

Checkpoints also govern the mobility of things and increasingly microbes and viruses. The focus in this section is on human movement through checkpoints.
Checkpoints are modular structures, composed of multiple components that are themselves mobile and can be fairly quickly set up and taken down or moved. State borders, whether at an airport, train depot, seaside port, or land border, usually involve a fixed port of entry and checkpoint where identity documents are examined and decisions are made as to entry. Aside from state-associated relatively fixed checkpoints, there are checkpoints run by non-state militias. These pop up during armed conflict and civil strife – think Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Palestine, southeast Turkey, Rwanda, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria – with often dangerous and deadly consequences. Checkpoints feature in counterinsurgencies as parties seek to identify and hinder the movement of potential targets. Yet state-organized and staffed checkpoints can also operate beyond the territory of the state, for example, in the case of Israeli checkpoints in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs), a landscape dotted with hundreds of checkpoints and barriers.

Checkpoints themselves are mobile. Temporary checkpoints, often called “flying checkpoints” to indicate their sudden appearance on a road, are common in conflict and post-conflict zones (Burnet 2012:156). These are unanticipated, hastily erected, makeshift structures that suddenly appear on the road – often with as little infrastructure as a booth, a couple of large square cement blocks to close the road, and several well-armed soldiers or paramilitaries stopping cars (Peteet 2017). With a focus on identity documents, these ad hoc checkpoints can be death traps or sites of disappearance. Run by the state, paramilitaries, or local militias, there is little accountability for their actions.

Checkpoints are an obstacle to and a means of surveilling, monitoring, and regulating movement. And, they are sites for disciplining and punishing the individual and collective body. As displacement from the global south ramps up, so have northern regimes of control governing population movements and individual mobility. The militarized U.S.-Mexico border, the wall and checkpoints in Palestine, the highly patrolled Mediterranean Sea (Albahari 2015), and Australia’s oceans are well-known examples of a global regulation of mobility with clear north-south dimensions with populations from the global south deemed threats to the global north. At a checkpoint, social orders and hierarchies such as race, ethnicity, class, nationality, and religion are at work. Internal state-run checkpoints, as in China’s western Xinjiang Province, have been established to identify and detain hundreds of thousands of Muslim Uighurs. At all checkpoints, identity documents are critical in determining rights to mobility and levels of violence inflicted on those seeking to pass. It is
worth noting that checkpoints to verify health status may become more prevalent as epidemics travel the globe. In 2014, with the outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa, Sierra Leone, for example, set up numerous checkpoints to assess people’s health status. We are witnessing a similar phenomenon in China with the coronavirus.

Checkpoints or roadblocks\(^5\) sort people and determine the right to live or die (Burnet 2012), to pass or be refused further movement. With the breakdown of state mechanisms of order, checkpoints can fill a gap by providing security for some but are also part of a general lawlessness. Non-state checkpoints can be an indicator of state weakness. As the Lebanese state disintegrated in the mid-1970s and civil war set in, militia-run checkpoints proliferated and were sites where hundreds died or disappeared. In Iraq a similar phenomenon prevailed in the wake of the US occupation and ensuing dissolution of the state. In the Central African Republic, “roadblock encounters are unpredictable and give rise to hybrid forms of governance in which state forms are invoked to further ‘non state’ interests” (Lombard 2013:157-158). These “interests” are profit achieved by robbing travelers. Thus “roadblockers take forms associated with the state and turn them toward non centralized aims, particularly for personalized profit” (ibid: 159).

Checkpoints are deeply embedded in documentary assemblages such as identity cards, passports, visas, and permits, as well as stereotyping by physical appearances. While checkpoints cannot be disaggregated from documentary regimes nor can they be separated from classifications, often state imposed and mandated that appear on identity cards, of religion, ethnicity, residency, nationality, gender, and age. In other words, one cannot easily disaggregate walls, borders, checkpoints, and documentary regimes or “paper walls” (Peteet 2017; see also Heyman and Horton 2020). At checkpoints, mobility is deemed either permissible or suspect. In each case some method of verification is usually required – it could be documentary but is often also based on subjective factors to assess risk. State bureaucracies govern the system of identity cards and permits that are integral to mobility regimes. States have “expropriated the legitimate means of movement” (Torpay 1998, 2000). Passports are crucial components in controlling human movement. Yet another set of mechanisms is at work, one much more subjective and non-technological. These are the culturally inflected, highly subjective, and non-technological practices such as imputing

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\(^5\) The literature on Rwanda tends to refer to checkpoints as roadblocks (Burnet 2012; Des Forges 1999; Fijii 2009).
identity based on appearances as happened in Rwanda during the genocide (Burnet 2012) and at the U.S.-Mexico border (Heyman 2004), or with accent in the case of Palestinians in Lebanon during the civil war (Peteet 2005) or assessments of risk due to demeanor. At checkpoints, or ports of entry, those on the move undergo a risk assessment, and its flipside, trust, (Heyman 2004), both determinations now often accompanied by biometric measures to verify that documents and identities are a match.

Checkpoints control the scope and speed of labor across international borders. In this age of racialized and xenophobic nationalism, checkpoints are part of the matrix of control that immobilizes and keeps out of certain spaces those deemed undesirable. They can be Africans seeking to escape armed conflict, fleeing the encroachments of climate change, or searching for work in Europe. They can be Palestinians forbidden to enter Jerusalem or travel from one area to another within the OPTs.

Checkpoints which impede mobility and sort bodies into categories with differential rights to move are one node in a matrix of mechanisms in the settler-colonial and occupation context in Palestine and in a regime of control over mobility across the U.S.-Mexican border. Both aim to control unwanted, racialized populations cast as interlopers of a sort - terrorists, criminals, or economic migrants. Checkpoints also control the flow of labor (Parizot 2018; Bornstein 2002). In Palestine, the checkpoints and the associated wall and identity cards and permit system is intended to fragment Palestinian territory and society, enforce enclavization, and prepare space for the expansion, consolidation, and annexation of illegal Israeli Jewish colonies in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Is there a definition of the checkpoint that can apply to all? Is it a modular form? The U.S.-Mexico border is controlled by a checkpoint most often referred to as a port of entry (Heyman 2009:368). Is the Mediterranean a newly reconfigured sort of checkpoint manned by Frontex, the EU’s border control agency? Frontex’s task is to monitor the Mediterranean for migrants and asylum seekers attempting to reach Europe to claim asylum. Just as the EU paid Turkey $3 billion to control the movement of Syrian, Iraqi, and Afghani refugees moving through Turkey to the EU, so the United States pays Mexico to obstruct the movement of migrants from Central America. The strategy pursued by the EU and the United States is to prevent an approach to the border point of entry where people may apply for asylum. Frontex acts to prevent migrants from nearing the shores of the EU thus pushing them to take more
dangerous routes at the hands of unscrupulous traffickers much as Australian naval patrols push boats full of migrants back out to sea, and the United States through its Prevention Through Deterrence Strategy pushed migrants further east into arid environments where thousands have perished.

It is at checkpoints that a regime of control over mobility unfolds. For millions of people, checkpoints are part of their daily experience and it is in this realm of experience, or how one goes about daily life in the face of immobilizing policies and techniques, that anthropology has made its mark on the literature. Over the last two decades, the checkpoint has become an object of analysis, both its location in larger schemes of demographic control and management of mobilities and as an experience for those compelled to pass through them. As archaeological anthropologists have studied mobility from the earliest stages of human history, cultural anthropologists are now training their ethnographic sights on the militarization and policing of borders and checkpoints, what Besteman has called “a primary-occupation of governments in the global north” (2019:S31) and the development of a global regime of apartheid. Rema Hammami, one of the first anthropologists to write about checkpoints, dubbed them exemplars of new forms of global inequalities (2010). Anthropology has provided a rich body of materials on the operation and intent of checkpoints and on how they are experienced and in the process, accommodated, resisted, subverted, and narrated. Above all, checkpoints are sites of anticipation – of risk, of violence, of disappearance, of brutality, of death (Burnet 2012, Peteet 2017), or the anticipation of passage. They funnel, identify, and filter those seeking to move from one place to another.

The rest of this section provides a survey of the anthropological literature on checkpoints. It is worth pointing out that the literature on checkpoints cannot easily be classified by discipline. The research is multidisciplinary from geography to communications to history, among others. Methodologically, most of this literature takes an ethnographic approach and is thus included in this review. A geographic focus on the Middle East, in particular in the OPTs, is due to the number of checkpoints in a very small area and the volume of research and publication they have generated. While the U.S.-Mexico border point of entry is a massive checkpoint, the literature on this area is less focused on the checkpoint per se and more on policy, the experience of approaching the border, experiences of crossing, deportation, and detention.
Themes in the Literature

Most literature on checkpoints is area specific: Rwanda and Palestine, for example. There are almost no works on checkpoints as a modular or generic global form. Checkpoints, however, are nearly always a component of controlling human mobility, and population flows and management, and global and local security, and all involve sorting into categories of permissible and forbidden movement. Scholarship where the checkpoint is the object of anthropological analyses is most prominent in the literature on Palestine where they are a pervasive part of the occupation and closure, and, to a lesser extent, Rwanda (Burnet 2012; Des Forges 1999) where they were a fundamental component of the 1994 genocide. These low-tech rudimentary affairs were deathtraps as they sorted people into ostensible ethnic categories. Identity cards were examined, appearances ascertained, and people sorted into Tutsi and Hutu groups; Tutsis faced violence and death; some Hutus were also killed or detained (Burnet 2012).

The checkpoint assemblage in the OPTs has generated substantial research and publication especially in anthropology and geography. In Palestine, checkpoints are part of an encompassing and multi-stranded “matrix of control” over mobility and population contact that has global resonance. Anthropologist Jeff Halper defines the matrix as an “interlocking series of mechanisms… that allow Israel to control every aspects of Palestinian life… Instead of defeating your opponents as in chess…you win by immobilizing your opponent, by gaining control of key points of a matrix so that every time s/he moves s/he encounters an obstacle…” (2000). Checkpoints work at the level of the individual and the collective and are the “linchpin in the matrix of control – of the direction, speed, and destination” of Palestinians (Peteet 2017:100). They keep some people in one place and out of another at the same time. Checkpoints also ensure an ease of mobility for some. Thus they can be sites where privilege is enacted and displayed for public view (Peteet 2017).

Two checkpoints in particular stand out as research sites: Checkpoint 300 in the occupied city of Bethlehem and the Qalandia checkpoint-now-terminal, between Ramallah and Jerusalem. Walled-in and besieged Gaza can only be entered or exited through a checkpoint. On any given day, hundreds of checkpoints are scattered throughout the West Bank. They surround

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6 Launched in 1993, closure refers to a policy of Israeli restrictions on the movement of Palestinian goods, labor, and people into Jerusalem, in and between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and between them and Israel.
the illegal Jewish-only colonies, Israeli military bases, entrances to Palestinian villages and towns, and govern entrance to the highly restricted bypass roads constructed to enable colonists to connect directly with Israel and other colonies on Arab-free roads. Checkpoints and gates are interspersed along the separation wall that snakes through the West Bank and control access to all main roads. Staffed by Israeli military, police, and private security personnel, for Palestinians under occupation, they are a prominent aspect of daily life. Checkpoints are part of a performance of security that enacts and publicly displays power (Razack 2010; Hammami 2019; Peteet 2017) to several audiences: those that attempt to cross them, those for whom they give a sense of security, and as advertisements in a global marketplace where security technologies are marketed.

Methodologically, participant-observation and semi-structured interviewing have been the most prominent forms of research. Ethnographic writing on checkpoints often is reflexive simply because anyone living, visiting, or working in Palestine must go through checkpoints to move any distance at all. It is participant-observation at its keenest. Indeed, Rema Hammami, anthropology professor at Bir Zeit University, commented that, “Rather than selecting checkpoints as field sites, they literally imposed themselves on my lifeworld.” For the past 15 years she has been compelled to go through two to three checkpoints to and from work. Her “grueling commute” became an ethnographic project (2019: S88).

Multiple themes can be discerned in the literature on checkpoints from the construction of space and mobilities along lines of privilege to impacts on economic life, access to health care and education, as well as social life, subjectivity, gender, temporalities, forms of violence, and technological innovations, to calculated ambiguity, privatization and the global security-industrial complex, to accommodation, subversion, and resistance, among others. Most explore intent, policy, context, how the checkpoint sorts and processes people, and how it is experienced.

Space/territory/population

Checkpoints occupy a prominent position in the Israeli policy of closure in the OPTs; on any one day there are several hundred checkpoints scattered throughout Palestine. Closure and its mechanisms, aim to implement spatial separation and fragmentation, exclusion, and strangulation (Falah 2005). The ultimate goal is to dilute the Palestinian population, encourage migration through immiseration, create enclaves for those who do remain and put
an end to the possibility of a two-state solution by preventing contiguous Palestinian territory (Peteet 2017). Enclaves give rise to contracting social worlds and new forms of localism as contact with others is severely strained (Taraki 2008). Tawil-Souri (2011b) and Peteet (2017) assert that checkpoints are in-between or interstitial spaces that seriously compromise Palestinian time-space – stretching time and shrinking space. Immobilizing Palestinians strangles them politically, socially, and economically (Peteet 2017) and is intended in part to produce docile subjects (Griffiths and Repo 2018). Checkpoints are part of a constellation of mechanism to fragment the OPTs into an archipelago constraining Palestinian mobility (Peteet 2017) and crafting space free of Arabs. Checkpoints surveil and manage Palestinian movement and create vast swathes of territory free of Palestinians. At checkpoints, the social order of privilege and subordination is on vivid display and enacted according to a variety of markers: nationality, citizenship, race, religion, age, gender, and ethnicity. As Hammami (2019) notes, checkpoints are contradictory sites: they separate people while simultaneously bringing them together in intimate encounters.

Heyman (2009:373) describes the U.S. side of the border with Mexico as a strip between 20 to 100 miles north of the border where a “distinctly intense immigration and drug law enforcement” order prevails. In this zone, interior checkpoints are located on main roads and are part of what is called “extended border searches,” in effect extending the border well beyond its actual physical location. In this zone, border agents have the discretion to stop people on the basis of appearance or profiling.

As noted above, a checkpoint cannot be disentangled from the documentary regime that governs their operation: identity cards, permits, passports, and visas. Berda (2017) and Peteet (2017) hone in on the permit system as one item in a complex apparatus for controlling Palestinian movement. Parizot (2018) and Griffiths and Repo (2018) elaborate on its role in maintaining and regulating the flow of cheap Palestinian labor into Israel.

In Palestine, checkpoints sort the population through a process of funneling and filtering (Peteet 2017: 99-138). Checkpoints, or roadblocks, were pivotal fixtures of the Rwandan genocide for it was at roadblocks that much of the population sorting unfolded sending people to their deaths or disappearance (Burnet 2012; Des Forges 1999; Fijii 2009). They were a means to find Tutsis trying to flee and kill them on the spot as per government orders (Burnet 2012: 60). Ultimately the purpose of the checkpoints was genocide, propelled by the
quest for a state without Tutsis. In Iraq, militia-run checkpoints read identity cards for sectarian affiliation (Sunni or Shite); many were kidnapped or disappeared and were later found dead after trying to pass a checkpoint. Under the guise of security and as part of counter-insurgency measures, U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan used handy laminated “smart cards” with descriptions of the language, appearance, and dress of the local population at checkpoints to determine ostensible ethnic, religious, and tribal identities and thereby govern mobility (Davis 2010, 2012).

Temporality

The slowing of time and imposed waiting has been captured ethnographically. Anne Meneley (2008) refers to “occupation time,” Peteet to “stealing time” and “weaponizing time,” and Tawil-Souri to “checkpoint time” (2017). Peteet (2018) argues that if time is an artifact of power, control over temporal rhythms and mobility work to map and display hierarchy and subordination. Slowing of time for some and not others gives rise to the absence of mutual temporalities. Yet the waiting that checkpoints impose hardly engenders a body in statis. Indeed, it could be argued that waiting is a refusal to concede, to go away. It reflects a determination to go about one’s business. Livia Wick’s (2011) work on waiting in Palestine also explores how women form new and shifting alliances in order to carry on with daily life in face of immobilization and long waits at checkpoints.

Turning to economic impact, Meneley (2008) writes of the critical olive oil sector of West Bank agricultural production and notes that “cultivation activities need to be carried out according to the seasonal cycle, yet for many Palestinian farmers seasonal agricultural time is disrupted by what one might call ‘occupation time.’” The mechanisms of the “matrix of control” – permits, the wall, and checkpoints – “distort the time horizon of olive oil production.” The harvesting, distribution, and consumption of olive oil are all exceedingly time-sensitive. Trucks carrying olives and olive oil, as well as other commodities, both perishable and not, travel on the same roads as Palestinians, roads that are often poorly maintained where they encounter fixed as well as flying checkpoints. The waits and oftentimes refusal of passage has had a serious economic impact.

Not surprisingly, Palestinians adapted in some small, entrepreneurial ways to the economic impact of checkpoints. At large time-consuming checkpoints such as Qalandia, there are a multitude of vendors hawking everything from fresh produce to socks and underwear to pots
and pans, coffee, ice cream, and soft drinks. Some small businesses moved near to checkpoints because of the crowd of people passing through or stranded there daily. In “Checkpoint Time,” Tawil-Souri (2017:386) contends that checkpoints foster temporal archipelagoes, along with spatial ones and that the checkpoint “structures Palestinianess itself.” Checkpoints, she claims, “perform temporal work,” which has usually been neglected in favor of a focus on spatiality (387). Checkpoints compel populations into “distinct time regimes” (388) and are part of a larger economy of temporal value” (388). Both Peteet (2017) and Tawil-Souri comment on the speed and predictability with which Israelis pass the checkpoint while the Palestinian waits in long lines with no assurances of passage, a visual and experiential differentiation of mobility.

**Subjectivity and the Body**

Subjectivity features prominently in research on Israeli checkpoints. Griffiths and Repo (2018) deem them state sites of regulatory bio-politics that attempt to produce a certain kind of docile and productive Palestinian body suited for labor in the Israeli economy. The discipline required to pass through Checkpoint 300 to their menial jobs in Israel often requires several hours each way making for an exceedingly long workday. Thus the checkpoint, they argue, “works to support the settler colonial project of the Israeli state through the production and management of a docile yet physically able male Palestinian labour force” (2018: 24). Hammami (2019) provides detailed ethnographic data to support her contention that the checkpoints remain sites of low-tech sorting and blocking and hence are sites of “exaggerated corporeality.”

Peteet framed checkpoints as “encounter-spaces” (2017: 99-100) between vastly asymmetrical communities, where Palestinians civilians and the Israeli regime interact. Anthropologist Dani Rabinowitz (2001) make an insightful point about spatial points of contact between Israelis and Palestinians as sites where Israeli identity and solidarity are expressed and reified. Palestinians, he contends, are an essentialized category central to Israeli identity formation and encounters with them are part of Israeli subjectivity. Along these same lines, Sherene Razack (2010) notes that spatial arrangements imprint power on bodies. Analyzing the physical encounter between colonizers and colonized at the Israeli checkpoints, that force Palestinians into a maze or over rocky hills to go around a checkpoint, is a pursuit to banish from the landscape, those to whom they know it rightfully belongs.
Impacts

Checkpoints, from Rwanda to the U.S.-Mexico border to Iraq and Palestine, have tremendous impacts, both immediate and long term ranging from the violence of death, disappearance, and humiliating and invasion bodily contact to the serious disruptions of economic life, employment, health care, education, and social life, including marriage and kin relations. Tawil-Souri (2011b) and Peteet (2017) remark on the disoriented relationship of Palestinians to geography and space-time. The once familiar becomes unknowable and often unrecognizable as the landscape is fragmented and time is stretched. Peteet (2017:152-166) details how access to medical care is hampered, trade is subject to delays and education is compromised by the inability of students and faculty to reach schools and universities. Kin relations are strained by the inability to visit and participate in lifecycle events.

Ambiguity

Reading a cross section of material on checkpoints leads to something of a surprise. For example, in Palestine, despite their embeddedness in the discourse of security, Israeli-run checkpoints are often chaotic places, governed by ambiguous, constantly changing measures for crossing. Absent written rules, the way is open for ambiguity, subjective determinations, and general chaos (Peteet 2017:119-122). Unpredictability as to soldiers’ behavior or orders for the day and thus the possibility of passing is always unknown. Rules change from one day to the next. In short, a clear pattern in the literature is of checkpoints as promoting chaos and unpredictability and unstable criteria of who can and can’t cross at any one time. Calibrated chaos and arbitrariness foster anxiety and disorientation and keep the body in turmoil.

Israeli philosophers Hagar Kotef and Merav Amir (2011) provide an insightful analysis of what they call the “imaginary line” at Israeli checkpoints, a line with no markings that constantly changes. It is the line one doesn’t cross without permission. The imaginary line constitutes a critical function of the checkpoint and that is to enable violence. They claim that what at first appears to be a paradox is nothing of the sort: the imaginary line is “an intrinsic failure which is built into the spatial configuration of the checkpoints….The failure produces Palestinians passing through the checkpoint as undisciplined, and hence as subjects whose occupation is justifiable, if not necessary… it enables violence…and…a justificatory framework for its violence” (2011:61). Thus checkpoints set up a system of failure for Palestinians which ensures the very violence the Israelis claim they seek to control.
Hammami reminds us that the binaries of Israeli/Palestinian, occupier/occupied, colonizer/colonized are hardly so simple. There are what she terms “some other grids of legibility” (2019:S89) that are more subjective. Bodies can be misinterpreted and soldiers have their moods. A common refrain about checkpoints is: “It all depends on their mood” as to how soldiers will behave at any particular moment.

With the stark power differential apparent at checkpoints, bribery and subterfuge, which Israelis personnel accommodate if not encourage (Peteet 2017; Hammami 2019), challenge the purported security rationale for the checkpoints. At Rwandan checkpoints, Tutsi could occasionally bribe their way through but were still murdered.

**Experience**

Historian Rashid Khalidi contends that “the quintessential Palestinian experience, which illustrates some of the most basic issues raised by Palestinian identity, takes place at a border, an airport, a checkpoint: in short, at any one of those many modern barriers where identities are checked and verified…For Palestinians, arrival at such barriers generates shared sources of profound anxiety” (1997:1). Peteet (2017) illustrates ethnographically the checkpoint a collective experience of being a Palestinian and contributing to a narrative of identity, subjugation, and subjectivity.

In Rwanda, low-tech roadblocks were erected by different people for different purposes. Run by state military, police, and militias and civilian males who, with little military or police training, were ordered to establish roadblocks to capture Tutsi (Des Forges 1999:13). Most were erected and manned by Hutu extremist political parties to find Tutsis. Many were erected on orders from government officials to find and kill Tutsi and others suspected of helping Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels. A few were erected to comply with the government orders to kill Tutsis but were also used by local communities to keep militiamen out and to protect people.\(^7\)

Writing on the Rwandan genocide both anthropologist Jennie Burnet and historian and human rights activist Alison Des Forges note that these low-tech roadblocks were used to sort Tutsis from Hutus. In the sorting process, identity cards were critical documents as were

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\(^7\) Personal communication with Jennie Burnet.
physical appearances (Burnet 2012:61; Des Forges 1999: 213). “They examined facial characteristics and configuration of the body to ‘expose’ Tutsi…. In some cases, they wrongly assumed that Hutu were Tutsi because they looked Tutsi” (Des Forges 1999:162-3). Des Forges noted that “They checked passersby for other supposed signs of links with the RPF, marks on their shoulders made by the rubbing of a gun strap or traces on their ankles resulting from the chafing of boots, or even scars or other marks that could be labeled tattoos indicating loyalty to the RPF” (Des Forges 1999: 162-3). Heyman (2004:309, 311) notes a similar phenomenon of bodily inspection at the US-Mexican border crossing, albeit without the attendant deathly danger, where Mexican travelers who appear to have money and speak English without an accent pass more easily than those who appear to be coming to the United States to work illegally. Humiliation and anxiety figure prominently into accounts of checkpoints. In most instances where checkpoints are a quotidian feature of daily life, they are sources of considerable anxiety (Peteet 2017).

The experience of the checkpoint depends on where one fits in a states’ or militias classification of the population. Heyman (2004:367) astutely points out that decisions by U.S. border officials in the southwest are made not just as to who cannot pass but as to who can as well. The classification of Palestinians is a complex and multi-layered system encoded in the Israeli-issued identity card every Palestinian must carry at all times. Their colored plastic covers are an immediate indication of place of residency and varying rights to passage (Peteet 2017; Tawil-Souri 2012). In Palestine, Peteet’s (2017) ethnographic observation of checkpoints ascertained that Israeli-plated cars whizzed through checkpoints while Palestinian-plated vehicles sit and wait for inspection and identity checks, often involving long and unpredictable waits. In other words, inequality and racialized social orders are clearly enacted at a checkpoint.

Gender
A small but growing body of literature on gender and checkpoints is emerging addressing issues such as domestic labor, violence, resistance, challenges to patriarchal control, sexual assault, and reproductive health care. At Rwandan checkpoints during the genocide, Tutsi women were often separated from family members and targeted for rape or sexual slavery before being killed. In Palestine, checkpoints are at times gendered with separate lines for men and women; men face more scrutiny and violence than do women. Spectacles of subordination and hierarchy infantilize and humiliate Palestinians men in public fashion. De-
masculinization unfolds as military personnel insult, physically attack, and humiliate men in public to display their inability to protect either themselves or others (Peteet 2017:126). Disciplinary routines “are designed to produce a gendered subject of compliance, an effeminization of the Palestinian male, immobilized and unable to protect or support his family” (Peteet).

The impact of Israeli checkpoints reverberates to domains well-beyond their actual geospatial location, namely the domestic realm and family relations and gender dynamics. Griffins and Repo (2020) argue that the border and checkpoints extend their effects into intimate everyday life, particularly the temporal dimension. This research is in conversation with scholarship on the temporal dimension of the checkpoints (Meneley 2008; Peteet 2018; Tawil-Souri 2017). They carry forward the literature on technologies of control over mobility by bringing women, children, and the domestic realm and social reproduction more forcefully into the equation and showing the range of technologies of control over mobilities. Checkpoints’ temporal dimension has an impact on those not actually present at them. Griffins and Repo (2020) detail the differential impact on men and women. The checkpoint makes for a long workday for men – usually beginning before dawn and ending well after sundown – and has a ripple effect on temporal routines, sapping the energy of both men and women, although in different ways. By removing men from the home for long periods of time, it fosters conditions akin to single parenting. The checkpoint seeps into or intrudes on domesticity and family relations, particularly wife-husband and father-children relations. Social reproduction expands and women’s domestic tasks become more onerous.

Sophie Richter-Devroe (2011) and Peteet (2017: 128-130) contend that Palestinian women’s continued pursuit of the quotidian activities of visiting family and friends or going to school, which involves slowed travel times and crossing checkpoints, is not only an act of resistance against the occupying authorities but is also an opportunity to challenge patriarchal forms of control.

In research on childbirth, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015) found that checkpoints hinder travel to medical facilities, resulting in women compelled to give birth at checkpoints. Between 2000 and 2002, 52 women gave birth and 19 women and 29 newborns died at the checkpoints. Military personnel at checkpoints made decisions as to whether or not a woman in labor could pass. Women shared with her birth stories in which they felt they were treated
as less than human - “unrecognized, unwanted and animalistic.” Bosmans et al (2008) found that the checkpoint reduced access to health care; for women this led to an increase in home births, induced deliveries, and birth at the checkpoints.

**Technology**

Amoore, Marmura, and Slater (2008) and Amoore (2006) address the intersection of mobility and surveillance systems at borders. Since 9/11, biometric technologies to assess risk and determine legitimate movement have proliferated. Much of the writing on checkpoints, whether at airports or on the roads, provides details on the sets of technologies deployed ranging from biometrically encoded identity cards to smart cards that read handprints to x-ray machines, among others. Yet checkpoint, even the most elaborate, still rely on low-tech, subjective factors such as demeanor to assess risk and threat (Heyman 2009). Hammami (2019), Peteet (2017), and Tawil-Souri (2011a) have noted the combination of high-tech and low-tech mechanisms at Israeli checkpoints. Alongside the high-tech surveillance apparatus that includes biometric and smart cards, closed-circuit television cameras, and metal detectors, low-tech measure prevail: paper identity cards and permits as well as the notoriously subjective soldiers’ assessments of each Palestinian coming through a checkpoint. Indeed, many checkpoints are simple affairs – a couple of large stone cubes placed on a road and several soldiers stopping cars and checking identity cards. Larger checkpoints will have metal turnstiles, multiple stations for checking documents, offices for personnel, larger staff, and walkways to funnel pedestrians in and out. Hammami insightfully reminds us that writings about Israeli checkpoints have tended to fetishize “technical sophistication at the expense of recognizing the embodied dirty work at its core” (2019:S87). She cautions against an overfocus on checkpoint technologies, which can marginalize the everyday experiences of those attempting to cross them, pointing to their inherent fallibility and the actions of the Israeli personnel who staff them (2019:S87fn. 2). She contends that the checkpoints remain largely low-tech due to the fallibility of technology and soldiers’ mismanagement of it.

Technological accoutrements at their minimum characterized the roadblocks in Rwanda during the genocide. Radio played an outsized role; orders to erect roadblocks to find and kill were often conveyed by radio and it “named persons to be targeted and pointed out areas which should be attacked” (Des Forges 1999:27).
Braverman (2011) contends that in the 2000s, modernization became the buzzword in the checkpoint regime in the OPTs; turnstiles, scanners, and advanced computer systems were erected and publicized as modernizing the large checkpoints which were now called terminals. Qalandia and Bethlehem checkpoints operate as full-scale borders and are touted as humane sites. Both are examples of the new terminals with their ostensible architectural and administrative up-grades, which are supposed to be more accommodating. Kotef and Amir (2007) illuminate the meaning of terminals, these “architectural monstrosities.” Situated inside Palestinian territory, they are “built like border crossings…between two sovereign entities and concealing the fact that Israeli rule applies on both sides.” The terminals “present a façade of legitimacy” (2007:982). In effect, they simply seek to legitimize the checkpoint endeavor. Mansbach (2009) critically scrutinizes these changes and concludes that they were an attempt to circumvent criticism. Despite “modernization,” humiliation, discrimination, and surveillance are pervasive (see Mansbach 2009; Braverman 2011; Kotef and Amir 2011; Peteet 2017; Hammami 2019; Tawil-Souri 2011b). Hammami (2019:S94) argues that these new high-tech features of the checkpoint-now-terminal were designed to “eliminate the possibility for embodied interaction between solider and Palestinian… and to preempt instabilities caused by Palestinian agency.” As technological mechanisms increased in scope and capacity, the distance between checkpoint staff and Palestinians increased. Passage has become a disembodied experience for Palestinians. However, they continue to operate with subjective determinations as to identity and risk assessment. Rijke and Minca (2019) contend that the spatial technology of the terminals remains a site of violence and tension now exercised by machines.

Around 2006, as technological accoutrements were introduced at checkpoints, their management and staffing were being outsourced to private Israeli security companies. Staff, however, were most often former military personnel (Havkin 2011). Anthropologists Eriella Grassiani (2013) and Eyal Ben-Ari (2005) have written on soldiers’ behavior at the checkpoint. Grassiani contends they have become numb to their task of controlling vast numbers of Palestinians while Ben-Ari contends they are also bored and frustrated by the task of running checkpoints. Peteet (2017:108) notes that checkpoint duty, or policing, does not easily articulate with their military training and self-image as warriors.
Resistance

While the literature on the checkpoints points to Israeli attempts to create a docile, quiescent body (Peteet 2017; Griffiths and Repo 2018), resistance has hardly been far from the surface. Palestinians deploy spatial tactics to subvert or find alternative means of movement. They simultaneously accommodate, resist, and subvert. Just to keep going was a form of resistance. With evidence of widespread abuse at checkpoints, a group of Israeli human rights activists organized Machsom Watch (Checkpoint Watch). They stand at major checkpoints, with clipboards in hand, observing and taking notes. Their self-assigned task is to monitor, intervene if possible, and compile witness accounts of Israeli behavior (Kotef and Amir 2007; Naaman 2006; Peteet 2017).

Within the OPTs, Palestinian are now cut off from each other as a result of closure’s mechanisms. Arouagh (2011) details the emergence of what he calls virtual mobility through which displaced communities and individuals can overcome isolation and connect with one another.
Summary

Walls and Borders: The México-U.S. Borderlands

Roberto Álvarez

The “rebuilding” of borders and new construction of physical walls has increased the separation, and “othering” of people and territories not only on the México-U.S. border, but globally. Physical and virtual walls, laws and institutions (in the United States, the Border Patrol, Homeland Security, and ICE -- U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) focus on the control of mobility, commerce and the most vulnerable groups of people.

With a focus on the transnational and global, anthropologists argued that nation-state borders were diminishing, the world shrinking as communication, finance, travel, and human mobility multiplied. Where we once focused on the human strategies of border connection, the built wall brings the challenge of separation, increased control, closure and removal. In this scenario the building of walls is part of the U.S. pattern of separation and removal of the unwanted into prisons, detainment centers, and across the international border. The wall challenges the notion of community while producing “settlements that include colonias, asylum and refugee camps.”

Cross-border commerce and trade illustrates the economic priority of border mobility. The Border Industrialization Program, NAFTA, and the American-Canadian-México trade Agreement have impacted and created important economies of scale. This includes thousands of maquiladoras (assembly plants) with over 1.5 million maquila workers in México. Export markets are situated in every Mexican border town. Ports of entry, such as checkpoints, control and define legality. These material changes challenge not only the cross-border personnel, familial, regional, and historic patterns of relationships, but the definition of the national boundary itself.

The people who live along the border and in the borderlands are primarily origin communities with deep historical roots in the border region. In addition to the people of Mexican descent, this includes Indigenous Native American Communities often absent in the analysis of the México-U.S. Border. The wall imposes tumultuous effects stifling free movement and tribal sovereignty, as well as stripping Indigenous peoples of sacred natural resources. Trump’s wall not only threatens Indigenous border communities but also Indigenous alliances, extended community and strategic cross-border cooperation.
The imposition of steel walls along the México-U.S. Border threatens more than the binational relations between the nation states. The media, politicians, and policymakers create the borderlands as a deathscape: a discourse that depicts the borderlands as desolate, violent, marginal, and alien to the rest of the nation. The immediate effects of the wall include the splitting of private land, encased natural reserves, and pushing the border north into U.S. communities. These actions deprive people of their rights, challenge the way of life, and separate this region from the rest of the U.S. Trump’s wall is both a symptom and a product of U.S. nativist ideology and racialized doctrine that violates human lives, local entities, regional social patterns, and democratic institutions. Once the icon of “border studies,” the México-U.S. border now exemplifies the vast restructuring of nation-state borders and the increased violation of global human rights.

**Walls and Borders: The México-U.S. Borderlands**

Social mobility has been a historical pattern along the México-U.S. border, but with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (marking the end of the Cold War), global borders manifested new forms of openness, flexibility, and cooperation (Furian 2016; Borneman 1998). In Africa, borders succumbed to state constraints, yet communities enacted unique survival strategies there (Anderson et al 2003a, 2003b; Donnan and Wilson 1999; Feyissa 2010; Flynn:1997 Lentz 2003; Membe 2006; Nugent 2002; 2012; O’Dowd 2010; Wilson and Donnan 1998; 2012). Geometrically increased migration, immigration, and refugee movement from Africa to Europe, Mexico and Central America to the United States exemplified transnational and global processes emphasizing the exacerbated flow and settlement of people, commerce, and trade on and across borders (Hoehne and Feyissa 2013). This includes not only the settled communities on international demarcations, but also the geometric increase of long-term migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers who flee home regions and are often forced to congregate at nation-state borders.

Ironically, after the fall of the Berlin Wall 33 walls have been constructed on international borders (Dorsey and Díaz-Barriga 2017; Díaz-Barriga and Dorsy 2020). As a security concern, the trope of walls (internationally) received a boost from the 9/11/01 terrorist attacks in the United States. The result has been intense security, militarization, and the constriction of travel across borders. “Rebuilding” borders and new construction of physical walls has increased the separation, and “othering” of people and territories both on the México-U.S.
border and on global borderlands. In addition to actual physical and virtual walls, laws and institutions such as the U.S. Customs, the Border Patrol, Homeland Security, and ICE focus on the control of mobility, commerce, and specific groups of people. The construction of walls, specifically “Trump’s Wall,” has not only affected human mobility along borders but is part of a framework that aims at closure, control, and crucially, the removal of unwanted populations.

The Re-Built Border a Challenge to the Transnational and Global Mobility

The “built border” challenges the broadly disseminating process of the borderlands and bi-national communities (Andreas 2000; Nivens 2002). From antiquity to the recent present, human settlement, travel, and mobility across and within border regions was part of the broader global demographic present throughout Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. This process is exemplified in México and the United States (Vélez-Ibáñez and Heyman 2017). Bi-lateral, bi-national elasticity of commerce and social relations existed since the colonial periods (Vélez-Ibáñez 1994) Yet the range of connection and global mobility has succumbed to the changing order of the nation-state, built walls and with it closure of the North to the South.

During anthropology’s focus on the transnational and global, anthropologists argued that nation-state borders were diminishing, collapsing in the wake of moving tides of people and goods, the world shrinking as communication, finance, travel, and migration intensified and connected what were once disparate areas of the world (Kearney 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Wilson and Donnan 2012). Research on the México-U.S. border focused on strategic human mobility across natural (geographical) and political boundaries. This discourse and the people on which it focuses is now challenged by the construction and trope of “walls.” Where we once focused on the human strategies of border connection, the built wall brings the challenge of separation, increased control, closure and removal. Anthropology illustrated how the México-U.S. border was a membrane, through which people lived their lives strategically (Alvarez 1987; Cook 1998; Heyman 1999; Klein 1997; Peña 1995, 1998; Vélez-Ibáñez 1996; Vila 2003, 2005; Richardson 1999). Yet, today we see a nation-state dynamic that aims to fortify, block, secure, and systemically control and contain people, while allowing trade, commerce, and non-human objects through nation-state corridors (Nivens 2002). Border scholars and activists have challenged the nation-states’ enforcement of security measures (Andreas 2000, 2002; Dunn 1996, 2010; Nevins 2002, 2010; Palafox
2000). But the underscoring of immigration controls, antiterrorism, and the actions and policy of countries throughout the world have reinscribed the nation-state on borders and in people’s lives. Walls are now part of these rebuilt borders.

Unlike on the México-U.S. border, Latin America barriers are not normalized but walls are being built throughout the nations of the south. In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and Lima, Peru, walls separate and enclose poor favelas from neighboring rich communities. Such barriers separating rich and poor have expanded into gated communities in various cities of México, Brazil, Peru, and Argentina (Navarro 2016). Walls exist between Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil and Ciudad del Este, Paraguay. In 2010 concrete barriers were begun between entrances at Ponta Porá, Brazil and Pedro Juan Caballero, Paraguay. In 2013 Haiti began constructing a wall on the border of the Dominican Republic. These walls separate rich from poor and exacerbate the security of lives throughout the South. The broad strokes and effects of Trump’s Wall extend into the Americas where displaced and threatened communities can no longer turn to the security of the North (Muros de la Verguenza 2012).

**The México-U.S. Border/lands**

The constriction of human behavior on borders is not new. On the US-México boundary, the history of the Texas Rangers (Paredes 1970), the birth and actions of U.S. Customs, the Border Patrol, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Homeland Security, and ICE (Heyman 2000, 2002; Lytle 2010; Rosas 2006, 2012) exemplify the institutions that alter human mobility, settlement, and quotidian life.

Built borders and controlled border processes have multiplied along the México-U.S. Borderlands; the construction and imposition of Trump’s Wall has fostered a variety of violently negative reactions in these communities (Díaz-Barriga and Dorsey 2020; Fleuriet forthcoming; Jusionyte 2018). The wall, embedded in immigration policy, and the response to the current Coronavirus pandemic (excluding and deporting asylum seekers and the undocumented) is a symptom of the nationalistic surge that is “rebordering” throughout the world. This includes a re-focus and emphasis on sovereignty and separation of nation-states. (Dorsey and Díaz Barriga 2017, Díaz Barriga and Dorsey 2020; Wilson and Donnan 2010).

The built barriers and walls along the México-U.S. borderlands emphasize the pattern of U.S. expansionism in which the *removal* of indigenous and ethnically unwanted people has been
the rule. U.S. immigration policy is a record of removal: The Chinese exclusion act of 1892; President Herbert Hoover’s deportation policy in 1930’s Great Depression removed close to 750,000 people of Mexican descent, including U.S. citizens (Balderrama and Rodriguez 2006); the internment of Japanese citizens during the Second World War (Lytle 2018; Kashima 1997), and most recently the policy of separation and removal of Mexican, Central American, and other immigrant families at the border. In this scenario the building of walls is part of the U.S. pattern of separation and removal of the unwanted into prisons, detention centers, and across the international border (Gomburg-Muñoz 2017; Lytle 2018).

The populations that live along the border and in the borderlands were primarily origin communities with deep historical roots and ties to the border region. The notion that “the border crosses us,” emphasizes the severing of connection and mobility with the construction of the wall. Initially free of all such barriers, the construction of fences and walls separate not only nation-state territories, but the people and communities that make borderland regions home (Díaz Barriga and Dorsey 2020; Dorsey and Díaz-Barriga 2017; Wilson and Donnan 2010). When the México -U.S. demarcation became a reality, Texas, the U.S. Southwest and California were populated by Indigenous, Spanish, and Mexican origin populations. It was the “American” colonial settler that was the other. Unlike the white colonial settlers, the populations that live along the border and in the borderlands were origin communities, with deep historical roots. (Alvarez 1987, Vélez-Ibáñez 1984, 2017a, 2017b). Currently these and current populations are under threat while commerce and non-human mobility is excluded from closure.

The continuing growth of cross-border commerce and trade illustrates the economic priority of border mobility. First the Border Industrialization Program, followed by NAFTA and currently the American-Canadian-México Trade Agreement, have impacted and created important economies of scale and a variety of informal sectors in the border economy. Currently there are more than 5,100 maquiladora (assembly plants) with about 1.6 million maquila workers in México----more than half of these workers live in the cities and towns along the México-U.S. border (De la O and Zlolniski 2020:4). The majority of the maquiladora workforce are women (De la O and Quintero 2001; Fernandez-Kelly 1983; Lugo 2008; Navarro 2002; Peña 1997; Wright 2003), who have been at the forefront of union struggles along the U.S. México -U.S Border (Zlolniski 2020). Export markets are situated in every Mexican border town. Fresh produce is the number one export of México, and (most of Latin America) to the United States. This trade relies on a specific “frutero” and
“comerciante” culture, in which social networks, cross-border associations with small businesses and U.S. corporations exist (Alvarez 2005; Gonzalez 2014; Zlolinski 2018, 2019). Numerous examples of commodity chains illustrate the connections in U.S. markets of specific fruits and vegetable regions, farm labor, production fields, growers and packing sheds throughout the south (Alvarez 2005; Barndt 2002, 2004; Carer and Alexander 2012; Stanford 1998, 2004). This pattern of economic structure is built into the strategy of “Trump’s Wall,” while negating the mobility and rights of humans living and crossing the border.

In addition to threatening mobility and removal generally, the wall has specific local effects. In Southern Texas some 40,000 acres of U.S land now sits in an ambiguous state south of the wall; portions of Brownsville and Hidalgo’s city development sites are now south of the border wall. The wall crosses through private property, state and local parks as well as private property and communities (Dorsey and Díaz-Barriga 2017:70). For many of the Hidalgo’s residents, the border has moved north by about one-half mile (Díaz-Barriga and Dorsey 2020:40). These material changes challenge not only the cross-border personal, familial, regional, and historic patterns of relationships, but the definition of the national boundary itself.

Although the interaction and social relations between communities in the United States and the Mexican regions persist, the wall—both construction and idea---brings an imperative based not only on nationalism and nativist sentiment. It is a response to the growing condition of the world and the Americas: mass migration of refugees fleeing the terror in their homelands of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mexico, producing the conflict between migrants and citizens, nation and acceptance, citizenship and human rights. Nativism in the name of security has intensified and become a parcel and initiative for walls.

Terrorism, especially after 9/11, has inflicted security measures and change on the México-U.S. border as well as in other nation states and their borders. The wall itself and its accompanying control is a terror producing element. Family separation, interior raids in the United States, the production of social isolation, new forms of human confinement, settlement and surveillance produce violations of human rights, deaths on the border, and increased clandestine behavior in the United States among immigrants and the undocumented. The wall challenges our notion of community while producing “settlements”
that include colonias (Donelson and Esparza 2010; Nuñez 2008; Nuñez-Mchiri 2012, 2008; Nuñez-Mchiri, Riviera and Marrufo 2017; Staudt 2017) detention centers (Gomberg-Muñoz 2017), and asylum and refugee camps. Actual crossings have become dangerous and more difficult (see Sheridan 2009; Spener 2010).

The Borders of the U.S. State: Difference and Diversity on the National Demarcation

The México-U.S. border/lands are often viewed as a 2000-mile strip hanging on the southern edge of the continental United States. This border (like others globally) is composed of various regions and differentiated cities, towns, settlements, and geographic regions (Arriola and Curtis 1993, Martinez 1988; Ortiz 2004; Vélez-Ibáñez and Heyman 2017). Essentially “the border” is a variety of borders and frontiers. The México-U.S. border consists of three primary sectors: (1) San Diego-Imperial Valley, (2) Arizona-Tucson, and (3) Rio Grande Valley (RGV) Sectors. The Rio Grande (or Rio Bravo) sector includes New México and Texas to Brownsville/Matamoros at the Gulf of México. In the RGV sector some 30 bridges (Alvarez 2012) span the Rio Grande River - the international demarcation. These bridges provide not only connection, but also regulated control of mobility, commerce, and cooperation (see: Cook 1998). After Operation Gatekeeper and the installation of duplicate and tertiary barriers in the San Diego Sector, migrants shifted their migration east. These areas from San Diego to Arizona are landlocked, forcing crossings through mountainous and desert territory that has claimed over 6,000 migrant lives (Cornelius 2001; Díaz-Barriga and Dorsey 2020).

Once small outposts, the cities and settlements of the U.S.-México border have expanded as a result of commerce and opportunities along the national boundary. Primary urban zones are juxtaposed on the border at crossings and custom and border patrol checkpoints. Although similar, these communities regions are defined by differing histories and development. In addition to these urban zones, numerous settlements parallel the actual border. For example, along México’s Highway 2, on the Mexicali to San Luis Rio Colorado corridor, agricultural “ejidos,” small towns and settlements span one of the most productive produce regions of northern México. In addition to the Mexican nationals who have settled here, Indigenous migrant workers primarily from Oaxaca are recruited to the San Luis Valley to work broccoli, onion, and fruit fields. The perception of a vast border with unchanging geography and settlement contrasts with the diverse reality: the contrasting size of cities, and settlements, population origins, commerce, and unique histories.
Indigenous Native American Communities are often absent in the analysis of the México-S. border, but have been pioneers in crossing and living in the borderlands (Kearney 1998; Stephens 2007; Velasco 2002, 2005). Social relations among Native American tribes strengthen, re-elaborate, create links, loyalties, and kin relations across the border regions that were once Native territory (Garduno 2016). In California, Yuman Peoples including Kumeyaay groups in San Diego County ranged the border between north and south. In recent times, Yuman settlements (Casinos) in the United States extended support to the small settlements of Pa-Ipai, Kiliwa, and the Tipai just south of the border. Yet, the imposed barrier has impeded such connection challenging both Native sovereignty and historical patterns of life. The Tohono o’odham Nation exemplifies the tumultuous effects of the proposed wall on Indigenous people causing irreparable harm and stifle the tribe’s free movement and tribal sovereignty, as well as stripping the Tohono o’odham of sacred natural resources for spiritual and cultural practice (Tasker 2019:318).

Two Yaqui settlements in Arizona (Tucson and Guadalupe) maintain historical and cultural ties to the Yaqui nation in Sonora, México. In addition to social and kin relations, each year during the Easter season, Arizona receives pilgrimages of Mexican Yaquis, and U.S. Yaquis travel south as well (Martinez 1988; HuDeHart 1981). Like the Yaquis, the Kickapoo are a border nation having survived as a distinct people even with forced fragmentation and dispersal. Cocopah along the Colorado River, on the California-Arizona Border, face new restrictions (Navarro Smith 2016). Trump’s Wall threatens historical and cultural patterns, as well as current livelihoods of Indigenous peoples and nations that recognize both sides of the border as native land.

Trump’s Wall not only threatens Indigenous border communities but also indigenous alliances, extended community, and strategic cross-border cooperation. Labor associations and unions--social movements--span the border from the Californias to Oregon (De la O and Zlolsniski 2020; Staudt and Coronado 2002; Stephens 2003, 2007; Velasco 2005). This includes transnational coalitions with unions, civic, and ethnic organizations in the United States to support Indigenous mobilization (Griffin 2009; Stephens 2007).

The focus on sister-cities and the diverse social systems that grow through “connection” are staples in border studies (Stevens 2011; Vélez-Ibáñez 2010, 2017). However, a focus on the
parallel regions on either and both sides of the border provide a nuanced perception and understanding of the border and the effects of a wall. The proposed and built wall threatens U.S. as well as Mexican communities. The activities and strategies of people living, for example, along the U.S. side of the Rio Grande Valley, the Tijuana to Mexicali range in Baja California, Mexico and across the border in the U.S. from the San Diego to the Imperial Valley as well as the various micro-settlements along these stretches of the boundary. People travel across the border and participate and rely on these regions to work, for health care (Jusionyte 2018; Schwartz and Baek 2016), for family union, for music, and for art (Madrid 2008; Peña 1995, 1998; Ragland 2008) daily shopping, school attendance, trade, and business (Jusionyte 2018; Muría 2010).

These activities are tied to commercial infrastructure, health institutions, development plans, and local and regional governments that include both sides of the border. The importance of social-kin and economic relations across borders illustrates human connections and creativity; yet, this border-“crossing” trope misses the unique pattern of cooperation, struggle, political, and quotidian efforts in local and regional sectors that parallel the border. Fleuriet (in press) draws attention to the positive generation of strategic action in South Texas, focusing on Rio Grande Valley leaders rather than on the “marginalized” populations that suffer the inequities of the wall and nation-state policy, and challenges the dark narrative of racial violence, suffering, and detention and asylum centers reported by the media, national policy, and the public. Fleuriet argues that the South Texas borderlands, the Rio Grande Valley, is a model of the U.S. Nation. Rather than marginal, the Rio Grande Valley comes to life as a strong U.S. region that is connected to México, but also as a true U.S. homeland for its residents and communities.

The anthropological research on border walls has taken a strong turn with the interest in Trump’s Wall (Dorsey and Díaz-Barriga 2017; Díaz-Barriga and Dorsey 2020; Fleuriet forthcoming; Heyman 2012; Nuñez-Mchiri 2017; Jusiónyte 2018). Díaz-Barriga and Dorsey (2020) raise questions concerning sovereignty and ask what the implications of border walls are for the future of democracy. They introduce the concept of necrocitizenship and draw attention to the ways in which the nation, the media, and the state policymakers create the borderlands as a deathscape. This includes immigration policies, the construction of the border wall, and the discourses and images that depict the borderlands as desolate, violent,
marginal, and alien to the rest of the nation. Jusiónyte (2018) illustrates the constant state of emergency in health care that the wall and state policy has created.

**Concluding Remarks**

The imposition of steel walls along the México-U.S. border threatens more than the binational relations between the nation-states. The broad descriptions of communities and processes presented above fail to account for the great diversity of people, places, institutions, and landscapes that are threatened by this built and militarized border wall. The wall—as part and symbol of immigration policy, has already claimed over 6000 lives and has served as a funnel that pushes migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees into life-threatening scenarios—deathscapes—opposed by U.S. citizens who live in these regions. The immediate effects of the wall on the United States has split private land, encased natural reserves, and pushed the border north into U.S. communities. These actions deprive people of their rights, challenge the way of life, and separate this region from the rest of the United States. The current and proposed wall exacerbates the isolation of multitudes of citizens, and negates citizenship itself. This ideology stretches far across the border and exacerbates poverty and violence in Central America by negating the human rights of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. Embedded in U.S. immigration policy, Trump’s Wall is both a symptom and product of U.S. nativist ideology and racialized doctrine that violates human lives, local entities, regional social patterns, and democratic institutions.
Border in and of itself Is a Wall: The U.S.-Mexico Border

Zahir Ahmed

Sitting near the fence at the U.S.–Mexico border, Kafi was waiting with his wife and two kids to cross. With the panopticon of U.S. border guards all around him, he looks at the dreamland wall, picks up his two kids, takes one step forward, gets captured, and is asked to go back. He was helpless and sapped over the course of a day of Covid-19 on the rampage near the U.S.-Mexico border.

Like Kafi, the biggest impact of Covid-19 on the lives of migrants is halted mobility. They can no longer transit through legitimate checkpoints. In critical passage areas, many migrants were told to stay put until the end of the crisis. In Panama, congregating informally in small towns is typical, while in Costa Rica, they often live in state-sanctioned makeshift shelters where groups such as the Red Cross provide services. Those who choose to avoid official checkpoints and shelters run the risk of getting arrested.

On the way back home, the returnees were harassed. The closure of borders has intensified the vulnerabilities of migrants transiting through Central America, as border patrols have become draconian and many were forced to stay in shelters insufficient for large groups and longer periods (Heyman 2012). Live footages show that overcrowding in these shelters, combined with the lack of access to clean water, masks or other protective equipment, as well as the shortage of food and other necessities, have posited many throughout the region in dire circumstances.

The incidences have a number of ramifications. At first glance it would seem that the forced migrations disconnected the migrants from the border more than ever throughout history. As usual, children bear the brunt of all things inhuman. Forcing back homeward during the pandemic not only pertains to immigration, but ideology and politics (Alvez 2020a). Thus the fact that people are turned away without regard to social distancing and other safety measures signals the Trump administrations resolve in building the walls.

In what follows I explore the relationship between border mobility, insecurity, and connectedness to the U.S. social hierarchy (Alvarez 1995, 2012; Heyman 2012). Alvarez has recently discussed how the state’s actions and policy have re-inscribed the nation-states on the borderlands and people’s lives. As he argues, the wall has now become part and parcel of
this ideology. The crucial question is: How does the construction of a material and ideological wall affect the people, communities, and economies? Before answering this question, let us have a hurried look at the history of the trend.

**Insecurity and Immobility: The Sufferings of the Trans-migrants**

While earlier phases of migration from Mexico to the United States were motivated by seasonal work, today Mexican migration takes different forms such as goods, commerce, and trade. The historical evidence shows that since 2017, more than one million Central Americans have made their way to the U.S. Southwestern border, triggering a disjointed but brutal crackdown by the Trump administration. Consequently, the combination of tighter border controls and the coronavirus has reduced these flows. Historical evidence also shows that Mexican migration to the United States peaked at the turn of the last century.

At the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, hundreds of thousands of Mexicans moved north every year, many evading border checks along the way. Later, many switched from seasonal work in the fields to more permanent year-round jobs in childcare, landscaping, hotels, and car parking. Access to better education has enabled many Mexicans to settle in the United States. Similarly, innumerable Central Americans came in pursuit of a better life. The majority of them were women and children, pulled, too, by the presence of family, friends and economic ties in the United States.

The immigration policy of the Trump administration has made aggressive efforts to stop these flows. It changed asylum rules, attempting to disqualify those fleeing gang or domestic violence, limiting the right to apply for asylum to those arriving at official border crossings, making it more difficult to seek protection. Quite a few complaints have been made to the effect that the families that went through the proper course under U.S. law were often subjected to inhumane living conditions, with children separated from parents and placed in detention cages. To this extent, the wall has scattered the migrants. U.S. citizens separated from their families and relatives have reinvented themselves as immobile human beings.

It is surprising then, that connectedness to the U.S. relatives is perceived as one of the few ways one can secure one’s family’s future. Crucially, these connections are mediated by kinship. In general, access to the United States is gained through the maintenance of legal aid and networking. It is in the case of Mexican asylum seekers, undocumented immigrants, and refugees who have entered the United States. This turns our attention to the larger questions
concerning the ways in which immigration to the United States articulates with the global political economy.

Subsistence has forced the Mexicans to risk their lives and move to the United States during this pandemic. Even prior to the pandemic, both public and private investments in Mexico had fallen to historic lows. Since then more than 12 million Mexicans have lost their livelihoods, as the government seems to have no plans to keep companies returning or to preserve jobs.

The virtual wall has also become apparent when the Trump government forces many Central American governments to stop the migrants’ mobility in the first place. Under pressure, Mexico also acquiesced to holding tens of thousands of Central Americans for months or more as they waited due diligence in the U.S. immigration courts. There was a significant decline in the number of Central American migrants. At the start of 2020, flows fell almost by half compared with the year before. With Covid-19 regulations in effect, it died down even further and an early stop in April and May.

Construction of walls explores the relationship between mobility, insecurity and politics of crossing the U.S. borders. While in earlier phases of the U.S. immigration laws, the argument for or against the asylum seekers or refugees to enter the United States was legal; today the arbitration is predominantly ideological and emotional–populism and dog whistle politics.

To this extent, the narrative of the Latin American migrants is one of displacement, in which the migrants have reinvented themselves as new vulnerable groups stretched and isolated across borders. Their stories broadly concur with other African and South Asian asylum seekers and refugees, where movement to sending areas has led to immobility. As we saw, U.S. control over the borders with Mexico are inextricably interlinked. Recent trends show that in order to continue mobility, the migrants need to move elsewhere to avoid Covid-19 in the United States, one of the hotbeds across the globe.

Remarks
In their aspirations to enter the dreamland, the construction of walls mark the death of the American dream. From an anthropological perspective, we can see how borders and walls have had a profound impact on movement and mobility of the migrants. It is evident that the Trump administration has used the walls as symbols of connection and disconnection on the
U.S.-Mexico border in order to control mobility. The aspirants experienced the harsh realities of immigration policies and processes that have controlled the migrants being brutally “disconnected” from global capitalism. Across the numerous borders in Latin America, the U.S. government has created multiple virtual walls, both material and ideological, through political hierarchy.

Walls can act as a symbol of relations as well. Although the asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants are disconnected from the center of global world order, they are connected in their desired of reaching the dreamland across the walls. The hope of the migrants remains strong; the constraints that they face come from the politically motivated government and its immigration laws, rather than the collapse of the labor market, though that may have changed.

Despite attempts of building walls by the current U.S. government to disconnect the aspirants, the changeover, it is anticipated, would help them get through in the near future. Democratic practices such as the law of immigration for the asylum seekers and refugees would help them remove the material walls. Through their constant movements between places and across borders, the aspirants seem to have believed that the wall is ideological. Since movement and mobility between, within, and across borders are human rights, the migrants will eventually overcome the ideological wall as well.

**Human Rights Issue**

Many advocates argue that the violation of human rights is a common phenomenon in the case of asylum seekers, refugees, and even legal immigrants to the United States (Dunn 1996). It is impossible to understand the situation of those people in the contemporary period without being dragged back into the violation of human rights for the immigrants both within and beyond the borders of the United States. One notices the common occurrences of violence, robberies, horrors of crossing borders, and bureaucratic red tapes driving these people into deeper vulnerabilities where hundreds were coerced into pushing back, causing widespread fear across the border all the way from Latin America to the South and Southwestern U.S. borders.

In addition, the Trump administration takes complicated measures to delay the processing of the asylum seekers’ or deportees’ applications. Many accounts suggest that the United States has been one of the worst violators of human rights for implementing its current immigration
policy, and has a deplorable human rights record (Heyman 2009). The entry into the U.S. borders have risky geographical terrains that are insecure for a number of reasons. Borders in Arizona, California, and Texas are full of jungles. Crossing these borders can be risky and sometimes deadly. So, migration into the United States is an insecure enterprise for the aspirants. Let us discuss some of the evidence brought out by the media.

The print media reported that hundreds of migrants were stuffed into the Senda de Vida shelter on the banks of the Rio Grande, waiting for a chance to claim asylum in the United States. Many claim that they were growing tired of waiting weeks on end subsequent to putting their names on a list, maintained on the Mexican side and used to ration precious access to the nearby port of entry that keeps getting longer as more and more people arrive from the south, one of the asylum seekers told the journalists when she was asking to put her name on the list and waiting her turn. Although it has been 65 days, she has not yet been called to cross the bridge and make her asylum claims.

Interestingly, U.S. authorities say they only have limited capacities to process asylum-seeking migrants at ports of entry. The situation has become worse when the Trump administration moved to expand the “remain in Mexico” policy. This means that asylum seekers must wait in Mexico while their cases move through backlogged U.S. immigration courts. Consequently, they look for an alternative route, leaving behind the relative safety of the shelter to press their luck at the bridges or crossing the river.

Large numbers of migrants were forcefully deported. The newspapers report that social distancing is impossible at the detention centers; people don’t have access to adequate sanitation, hygiene supplies, or medical care. According to the Center for Economic and Policy Development, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arranged for 232 deportation flights to Latin America and the Caribbean between February 3 and April 24, 2020. Human Rights Watch claims that some migrants deported to Mexico, Haiti, El Salvador, and Guatemala have already tested positive for Covid-19.

On the other hand, the United Nations Network on Migration, which includes the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the UN refugee agency, requested governments to “suspend forced returns during the pandemic, in order to protect the health of the migrants and their respective communities, and uphold the human rights of all migrants regardless of status.” They have argued that forced returns can expose these
people to serious public health risk. Although the appeal came from many human rights organizations, the U.S. government continues to force deportees to brave the heightened risk of Covid-19.

As this evidence shows, migration to the U.S. borders is an inhumane enterprise. This involves crossing highly insecure terrains of North America. The U.S. immigration policy often ignores human rights, and without ensuring the requisite paperwork, the immigrants are delayed. The work is usually arduous and unpleasant (Fleuriet and Castellano 2020). Even if a migrant goes to these destinations legally, they remain subject to deportation and denial of basic rights. This is especially the case in the context of the pandemic.
India/Bangladesh Border Wall

Zahir Ahmed

Migration has been a livelihood strategy of East Bengalis for many centuries (Samaddar 1999; Schendel 2005). Indeed, the territory of what in the colonial period was East Bengal, in 1947 became East Pakistan and only since the War of Independence in 1971 has been known as “Bangladesh has always been characterised by high degrees of fluidity, both within and across its shifting political borders” (Gardner and Ahmed 2008). From pre-colonial times migrants from the west settled the highly fertile lands of the east, while other historical evidence points to movement in the other direction, a continual flow of people, irrespective of national borders (van Schendel 2005). These constant, cross-cutting mobilities are both a result of the region’s turbulent history, and its turbulent environment, in which floods and cyclones mean that “belonging” can never be guaranteed (van Schendel). As Samaddar continues, “This dream has made Bangladesh a land of fast footed people, people who would not accept the loss of their dream, who would move on to newer and newer lands …. ” (1999: 83-87).

Today, this mobility is still common across Indo-Bangla borders for business, employment, medical treatment, visiting relatives, and so on. But the Indian government argues that the scale of this movement is “illegal” and “undocumented.” While some move to visit relatives residing in India after partition of 1947, the vast majority migrate as wage laborers, often resident in Assam and adjacent border states of Meghalaya and Tripura. The current BJP government claims that many more Bangladeshi move illegally and are thus becoming permanent.

Heyman (2012) has reminded us that border walls and related infrastructure (such as ports of entry, checkpoints, and surveillance systems) should be understood as political acts, in its wider meaning. According to him, they have overt, formal rationales. Anthropological investigation enables us to see how they have unstated goals and effects that are essential in their social analysis.

It is relevant to mention that the international border between Bangladesh and India is 4096.7 km long, which runs across India’s West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram.
Historically, this border was demarcated by the Radcliffe Award of the Bengal Boundary Commission in 1947.

There are some noteworthy features of the Indo-Bangladesh borderlands. These include the border’s small bazaars, which are filled with Indian goods. The local bazaars not only sell food and goods but also offer money exchange, mobile phone, and Internet services. There are also a high number of borderland wage laborers from Bangladesh connecting their homesteads (baris) and their fields to the other side of the fence. These paddy fields have all been managed by Bangladeshi peasants. Strikingly, their livelihoods are threatened by the Indian militarization and their surveillance through building fence walls. The situation became worse during the lockdown since March 2020. So movement is increasingly becoming restricted. The inhabitants on both sides are not able to claim their historical entitlement and are only found dead whilst crossing the fence (Odhikar 2020)

Secondly, and significantly, the outward movement of Bangladeshis to India is linked to work opportunities. In search of livelihood, it is not unusual for unemployed to move to relatively wealthier regions. This is the case in the classic example of U.S.-Mexico borders where a large number of migrants are awaiting to enter the United States. In the case of Bangladesh, the reasons for these movements are varied and depend in part on the type of migration that has taken place (Gardner and Ahmed 2008). For many Bangladeshis, they migrate as seasonal laborers and find their temporary migration as part of a livelihood strategy. Like the seasonal agricultural laborers described by Rogaly et al in West Bengal (Rogaly et al 2002) or Mosse et al in Western India (2002), movement between places can be interpreted as one strategy amongst others in a range of livelihood options.

The dynamic movement has historically been disrupted when borders are restricted. Why does the Indian government build fences to create a border barrier? In order to unravel the answers, we need to examine Indian government’s intention and justification, as well as the geo-political realities. As we shall see, the ideology of building fences/walls, and the way in which it is used, is a key factor. Let us see the historical evidence of building fences/walls in Indo-Bangladesh borders first.
Background of Wall/fence

Following the partition of 1947, human mobility became necessary for relatives living in the two Bengals (one in Bangladesh and the other in India) to interact with each other. India has built barbed-wire fences by overlooking this reality altogether.

After 1970, the steady influx of Bangladeshi migrants in Assam’s North-East part triggered an ethnic backlash. In response, India built fences on its border. This fence has become the site of National Identity, politics and contestation over irregular migrants. The British-ruled Bengal and its people, who were connected through culture, family relations, and trade, now had a boundary between them.

The partition of 1947 and later the Assam Accord of 1985 led to the construction of a barbed-wire fence between two sovereign states. It was a political project, one that identified who India considered as “unwanted” and “others”. The goal of this entire project was to prevent the flow of irregular migrants. To preserve the purity of “Indian identity,” successive Indian governments look for their “others” through the fence or wall. In that context, this fence or wall is the symbol of fear, separation, and domination (Mookerjee 2018; Simonneau 2017).

Joya Chatterjee has pointed out that a population displacement was followed by the Partition of India in August 1947 and subsequently the birth of an independent Bangladesh in 1971. Human mobility at the time increased in both the countries as refugees shifted their countries, resulting in a significantly relaxed border (Chatterjee 2013: 274). In its 2010 statistics, the United Nations says, international migration has taken place from Bangladesh to India. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the ruling party of India, has seized this piece of statistics as their political weapon. To deter the Muslim migrants from entering Assam, they proposed to erect a high modern electrified fence in the border.

It was an 8-foot-tall barbed-wire fence, which was electrified. Even after this, the mobility of Bangladeshis didn’t stop because to visit and in search of livelihood they needed to go to the other side of the fence. On both sides of the fences, smugglers, drug traffickers, and cattle rustlers continued their trades and all these took place with the help of border troops on both sides.
The Disruption of Mobility

Van Schendel has explained how the state stopped the cross-border migration and what effects it left on individual migrants and their networks. We know that people of Bangel in the deltaic region became known as mobile inhabitants for their movements in search of livelihood. This movement started in the 19th century. They defied forests and rivers to settle in this area for farming.

After the 1947 partition, there was prevalent mobility among people on both sides. According to Schendel, it left two consequential impacts. First, this movement was identified as "international migration" due to the involvement of border-crossing. Thus, it has been declared that anyone without valid papers will be deemed illegal. Second, in the narrative set by the state, they were considered political migrants and, by extension, identified as repatriates, refugees, displaced persons. In this manner, the border has turned citizens into "infiltrators."

As a result, India exerts its influence on the borderland society in several ways. One such example is the setting up of a barbed-wire fence across the border. Therefore, the current fencing activities aren’t anything new at the India-Bangladesh border. Assam’s local politicians were the first to propose the installation of barbed-wire fences. To prevent those “infiltrators” from entering, a 150 km border area was brought under electrified fencing (van Schendel and Maaker 2014; Rahman and van Schendel 2003).

The installation of a high-tech fence can be compared with the United States’ efforts to deter immigrants’ infiltration from Mexico. As a result of electrified fences, movement of Bangladeshi farming workers to the border area was affected, which left a serious strain on their livelihood (van Schendel 2005; Datta 2018). The Indian government’s responsibility is to prevent infiltration from entering and not to accept these “foreign” migrants. On the other hand, successive Bangladesh governments have always taken the denial approach, denying that the migration of Bangladeshi citizens to India even takes place.

Violation of Human Rights and Its Impact

Bangladesh-India relations are rooted in friendship--or so is claimed by both parties. However, historically, India is known as a strong state, while Bangladesh a weak one--a notion that is reflected in Bangladesh’s foreign policy. For Bangladesh, killings on the border are everyday affairs. In 2011, Felani, a 15-year-old girl, was shot and her dead body was put
on the barbed wire fence at the India-Bangladesh border. Felani and her father were illegally crossing into Bangladesh. India’s border security force, BSF, responded by opening fire to stop Felani to stop her from crossing across. Subsequently, her lifeless body was left hanging on the fence. There were no serious protests from the Bangladesh government over the killing.

Human rights organizations published reports revealing how Bangladeshi citizens were killed ruthlessly at the India-Bangladesh border. According to their studies, the Felani incident was no different than many other killings which are now a regular phenomenon like the using of force, arbitrary detention, and torture (Human Rights Watch 2010).

Crossing the Bangladesh-India border is a daily life routine for the people of both countries, whether it is for meeting relatives, trading, or getting health care. And, for this, Bangladeshi citizens suffer persecution and deaths at the hands of India, a strong state. But why do Bangladeshis cross the border, both legally and illegally, despite severe risks? What are the consequences? According to Rehnuma Ahmed, an anthropologist, "The fence divides and separates villages, agricultural lands, markets, families, communities of cats across mangrove-swamps in the south-west, forests and mountains in the northeast" (Ahmed 2011).

On the side of Bangladesh, we noticed how the barbed-wire fence that went through the middle of a nearby house split a single family into two parts (Simonneau, 2017; Sur, 2014). Two brothers ended up in two different countries. There are even some houses where the kitchen is in one country and the bedroom is in the other. It is as if the barbed-wire fence is a wall that has divided citizens from what once used to be their family. This is not merely the severing of emotions and ties, rather a big example of robbing civil rights.

Social media platforms, political organizations, and human rights bodies have raised their voices against the successive governments of Bangladesh. They allege that the governments are not vocal against all these sufferings at the border. Malini Sur (2014), in her article titled “Divided Bodies: Crossing the India-Bangladesh Border,” has noted that India is installing barbed-wire fences across their border out of the deep suspicion of Muslim migrants.

According to statistics by the Human Rights Watch, 1000 Bangladeshi “infiltrators” have been killed in the past decade. It is claimed that they did not have valid documents, but the crossing of Indians into Bangladesh was never taken into account (Ahmed 2011).
Killings along the border did not stop though. They continued unabated during the ongoing pandemic. The numbers of people killed along the border rose in 2020, compared with the last year when BSF fatally shot 28 people. According to the human rights organization Ain O Salish Kendro (ASK), as many as 39 Bangladeshis have been killed by BSF in the first 9 months (January-September) of this year alone (Human Rights Watch 2010).

During the pandemic (in March 2020), India imposed lockdown along the border, while Bangladesh announced general holidays. These measures halted mobility in the region. No one was killed at the border that month. But from April to October, 21 Bangladeshis died at the hands of BSF. In total, according to ASK data, 522 Bangladeshi died along the border between 2009 and 2020. Among them, 324 died after being shot by BSF and 159 were physically tortured. These killings were reduced from 2015 to 2018 but surged again in 2019 (Rezwan, 2011; Datta 2018). Anthropologist Willem van Schendel has termed the India-Bangladesh border as the “Killer Border.” According to him, in the border areas between two friendly countries, as many as 2428 people have been abducted, killed, and injured in the span of 5 years (van Schendel and Maaker 2014).

Even today the border killing is occurring. History tells us that people living close to the border on either side are in a conflicted corridor and they have been living in insecurity since the partition. In that context, the Indo-Bangladesh border area is essentially an uncomfortable troubled zone. In both countries, separatists have moved back and forth through the borders politically as armed conflicts have persisted. Lands of Bangladeshi farmers used to be grabbed and their crops seized. As a result, India seized the scope for militarization, while the border has become space for surveillance. Territorial disputes and contradictions between the two countries have hindered the movement of people, who as a result have become the victim of state violence (e.g., Kurigram border in Bangladesh and Bangladesh-Assam border).

Impact of Border Restriction

We need to understand everyday mobility in its own context. Issues such as political violence (like the killing of Felani, a Muslim) and territorialities are also connected to it. Bangladeshis, for these reasons, are afraid of such violence and trauma those incidents leave behind. Many researchers have pointed this out in their studies (Das 2008).

We see how the daily life movement of people living there is portrayed as “border crossing.” And therefore, to prevent people’s movement (the infiltration from Bangladesh to India), a
border wall was constructed, and militarization took place as a result. People who cross the Indian border without valid documents end up as victims of state repression.

In "Divided Bodies," Sur (2014) attempted to argue that divided bodies are created because of the “structured deficiencies of barriers,” divided bodies are created. And migrants like Felani get stuck on the barbed-wire and then shot dead by the Indian troops. Who is to take responsibility for this? How do we explain "this wall"? How do we explain the fact that migrants like Felani are punished by being shot dead rather than subjected to legal actions? It becomes important to look beyond the visible border wall and take into account the invisible communal barrier.

It is important to understand the term migration. Unless we can understand the contexts as to who refugees are, why they cross the border for their daily life necessities, why people can’t adhere to the rules while crossing the border, and who protected travelers are and the unprotected are, we will not be able to grasp the political economy and cultural aspects beyond the border. It is also important to understand that the diversity of moving and travelling is a two-way road. Issues such as weak versus strong state, hierarchy, and power should also be taken into account.

Reece Jones, in her book Violent Borders: Refugees & the Right to Move, says, “Border fences rarely work and stop migration.” According to Jones, border fences are “nationalist symbols” and its main theme is “the idea of excluding another population,” in this case, Muslim Bangladeshis (2012). We see the same situation with Donald Trump’s plan of building a border wall at the U.S.-Mexico border.

The justification behind the Indian plan is that Bangladeshis are “illegal” and “outsiders.” According to Jones, the installation of fences has had an adverse impact on the livelihood of people living in the borderland area. So, the Bangladeshis see India as the “bullying big brother” (Jones 2012, 2009).

Because Bangladesh is bordered by India on three sides, it is feared that any national disaster will endanger the people of the coastal region of the country. For instance, Bangladesh’s Khulna, Satkhira, and Bagerhat have long borders with India. Due to floods, agricultural lands and houses in these areas go under water almost every year. When that happens, people
want to go to the other side of the border. They want to cross it but are blocked by the fences (Sudha 2017).

The “smart fence” project was first launched in the Dhubri region of Assam in April 2018. This ambitious project by the Modi government was the start of an initiative to completely seal off India’s border with Bangladesh and Pakistan. It is called the Integrated Border Management System (IBMS) project. One notices that most of the surrounding areas of the Assam-Bangladesh border is riverine. The Modi government tried to stop “illegal migration” and “cattle smuggling” on this frontier. High-tech surveillance systems and warning systems were installed in the borders for the first time. The movement of people was controlled by building new types of walls. Along with militarization, this surveillance system was formed using camera and radar technologies.

Borders or walls get restricted (in terms of the actual tightening of borders through walls/greater restrictions) because of geopolitics as well (Rezwan 2011). The Modi government’s policy to stop the Rohingya refugees also resulted in an increased number of border killings in 2019. The level of intensity of surveillance at the border fluctuates depending on the government’s policy. Border killings are contradictory at a time when Bangladesh, India, and Nepal have signed trade deals and introduced a policy of opening up borders for each other.

The size of India's exports to Bangladesh is much higher than that from Bangladesh to India. In FY-19, India exported $1.22 billion worth of products to Bangladesh. These trades are done using trains as well. Those trains continued to run through the Petrapole – Benapole route during the pandemic. After March, the Indian government approved the use of cross-land border transportation as well (Abhishek 2020).

Borders become a site of performance for proving “congenial relations”. The Indo-Bangladesh Border haat (market) is supposed to strengthen border trade and social connection between the two neighbors. It is a weekly market organized by two countries in four different district borders. The objective of this haat was to bring people from both sides. It is one kind of public performances and narrations, which celebrate the flexible borderlands. The high officials of both countries show their diplomatic performances that the “congenial relations” of the borders becomes most explicit. While successful border engagement is generally performed in borders like Sylhet, the importance of the performances for both
countries lie in promoting the well-being of the people living remote areas across the borders. People can buy local produce from these markets.

The ways in which borders haat is celebrated is the focus of performance of “peaceful” borders. Paddy fields are prepared for this event, banners erected, high officials of adjacent districts in both sides and local villagers of borderlands invited. Once assembled, speeches are made, photographs taken, usually of the moment of “inaugural” the local goods, including clothes, soap, spices, kids’ essentials, food, domestic cookeries, oil, plastic products, ceramics, and cosmetics are displayed in the new border haat.

There can be little doubt that border haat creates a space of real feelings of emotion and connection with the relatives and neighbors. Indeed, the role of emotion, has received little if any analysis in the border studies. This kind of performance needs to be sustained. Many Bangladeshi people laughingly told the media that the border haat is rhetoric in the sense that it takes place infrequently.

Another important issue is the complexity of the border’s political economy. Essential products freely come to Bangladesh from India, but oftentimes they destabilize the Bangladeshi market by deliberately creating a crisis. For example, recently the onion crisis caused a hue and cry in Bangladesh. It has been a few months since India stopped exporting the essential cooking item to Bangladesh. Vehicle movement between the two countries has been disrupted by the heavy border surveillance. Amid the Covid-19 lockdown, this situation turned severe, causing prices of essential commodities to skyrocket.

Also, the movement of people between the two countries has come to a halt during the pandemic. A huge number of people go to India for medical treatment every year. This year (2020), however, they could not. Every day, as many as 500 trucks come and go using the border crossings. Many people’s livelihoods depend on the continuation of this movement. Moreover, visiting relatives across the border has stopped completely. No one wanted to risk their life by crossing the barbed wires.

Due to labor shortages there is high demand for out-migrant labor in India. This consists of seasonal laborers from greater Sylhet and Dinajpur districts in Bangladesh. These laborers come to the adjacent villages in West Bengal, Tripura, and Meghalaya at harvest time. Historically, laborers arrange with their employers how many days to work for a day or for a
certain period of time. Most of them have no bargaining power with their employers as they do not have legal status and thus stay for a day as a wage laborer. Some of these, like the West Bengali agricultural labourers described by Rogaly et al, are hired in groups by sadars (labor gang masters). All of these laborers are attracted by the employment opportunities in the borderland areas. Due to heightened surveillance and fear, these laborers do not want to cross the borders. During lockdown, they have become unemployed, which in turn makes their livelihoods vulnerable.

This obstacle is the high-tech fences and walls that will be erected to control people’s movement, which will lead to militarization and killings, while free movement between the countries will continue for trade purposes. This trade relation is uneven. India is freely using Bangladesh for trade. According to one source, in March during the pandemic, 2,300 Indian trucks entered Bangladesh using the Petrapole – Benapole border crossing, situated 100 km away from Kolkata. The locals in that area resisted those trucks in fear of Covid-19 transmission. A lot of the trucks were stopped.

In this case, observations made by Heyman (2012) are important. According to him, the installation of border walls is accompanied by checkpoints and surveillance. Eventually, these activities become political acts. We can see the evidence of Heyman’s observation at the India-Bangladesh border. To build a barbed-wire fence or a border wall, India presents an official justification. This justification is usually for the protection or well-being of its population. In the name of safeguarding, the sovereignty of its people, the Modi government talks about preserving the Hinduism, takes a strong stance against the infiltration of terrorism, and talks about the establishment of civil rights. Similarly, Donald Trump wants to prevent the infiltration of illegal immigrants by building a wall at the Mexico-U.S. border. Such assertions by heads of states raise two questions, which are: 1) How does the wall perform? 2) How do dominant power ideas (fears and aspirations) legitimize the construction of the wall?

Historically, we have seen that surveillance at the border is often heightened and sometimes it is relaxed. We have also seen during different regimes that the level of ties between India and Bangladesh fluctuates depending on the types of governments in power on both sides at a given time. And, it is also manifested by the increase or decrease of incidents like killing and abduction at the border.
The current government in Bangladesh has enjoyed good relations with both the current Modi government and the previous Congress-led government in India. Recently, India was termed as kin by a high-level official of the Bangladesh government. When border killings take place amid “friendly” ties, both sides hasten to call those incidents “unwanted” and “unfortunate.” If so, why are border troops responsible for such incidents not tried and held accountable? Heyman’s observation on the matter is simply eloquent. He says, “Walls deny relationships and responsibility. Walls simplify complexity, and walls enact and reinforce hypocrisy” (2012: 3).

But we have to distinguish between different kinds of hypocrisy rather than rush to condemn walls merely deny relationships. I argue for another form of discernment between different acts of strong states when dealing with the borders: one must take into account the essence of political anthropology that stress the importance of relationships, history, and culture. For Bangladeshi people, contradictions between official announcement of human rights and failing expectations cannot be ethically tolerable. Hypocritical shape-shifting becomes equally intolerable when the bilateral relations turn unequal and aggressive in borderlands.

Conclusion
By drawing on secondary sources, I have shown the situation of the Bangladesh-India border and the barrier that was to have been erected there. My analysis of the historical relationships between India and Bangladesh show that the border relations are embedded in power relations that reflected in building fences and walls. To navigate these, we need to find everyday interactions in borderlands during their visits of the “migrants” from Bangladesh to India. For Bangladeshi citizens, their movement to India is intertwined with different kinds of relations in three senses.

First, in contrast with portrayals of official rules, the everyday interactions between Bangladeshi and Indian habitants make it clear that the inhabitants need to maintain informal relations with the border guards and many other brokers to enter. In both ends, inhabitants are keen to attend social events, such as weddings and funerals, and engage in agricultural activities as laborers.

Second, in contrast to many other borders in the world, Bangladeshi and Indian families are sharply divided by fences, which are visible. This is in contrast to family reunification at the
U.S.-Mexico border, who attempt to keep their personal relations with the kin residing in the United States.

Third, the justifications of resisting the “illegal migrants” depends on the political will of the ruling party in India. If politics is about competitions over voting, then the issue of Bangladeshi “infiltration” is a necessary game of communal politics to win support and make and ensure power. This third aspect of politics is almost common across the global borders. In both U.S.-Mexico and India-Bangladesh borders, Donald Trump and Narendra Modi are more interested in taking projects on building walls and fences through high-tech cyber projects for surveillance. Measures like fences/walls built to prevent the migrants from entering may be the equivalent in the United States, but in Bangladesh, relationships include degrees of bilateral relations and internal political situations.

I have also argued that the hierarchy of the country influences the borderlands. A weak state like Bangladesh always maintains “friendship” when border disputes happen. With a situation of human rights violation facing many migrants across the borderlands, the study of the impact of walls has recently become interesting to many scholars, both inside and outside anthropology. This article makes the argument for doing so in the context of the India-Bangladesh border that takes account of history, walls, and mobility.
Comparison & Contrast; India-Bangladesh and the U.S.-Mexico Borders
Zahir Ahmed

In my report on the India-Bangladesh border situation, I outline the border’s history, the role and technology of security fencing, and the economic interdependencies on either side of the international line. I have also shown in the parallels with the U.S.-Mexico relationship report.

On the basis of that we could raise one question: In the U.S.-Mexico case, there is a formal trade agreement between the two countries that, among other things, created a series of industrial factories on the Mexican side of the border that supply machine parts as well as finished goods for the U.S. market, have easy passage into the United States, but are not subject to stricter environmental and worker safety regulations. They also take advantage of lower prevailing wage rates in Mexico. This arrangement is known as the *maquiladora* complex. But India does not have a similar arrangement with Bangladesh. The cost of transporting goods is much higher than the cost from Dhaka to European or U.S. ports, although Bangladesh has an opportunity to enjoy a lower cost from India. The unequal trade relations between the two countries turns the bilateral relations into India’s monopoly. This mindset can be seen in the context of border restriction.

From an anthropological perspective, we can see how borders and walls have profound impact on movement and mobility of the migrants. It is evident that the Trump administration has used the walls as symbols of connection and disconnection on the U.S.-Mexico border in order to control mobility. In a similar vein, the movement of people in India and Bangladesh borders has historically been disrupted when borders are restricted. Why do the strong governments build fences/walls to create a border barrier? In order to unravel the answers, we need to examine the respective government’s intention and justification, as well as the geopolitical realities. It is evident that the ideology of building fences/walls, and the way in which it is used, is a key factor. In addition, the following are also important:

1. The differential impact of a wall on the mobility and livelihoods of those affected by it.
2. The “justifications” of building walls/fences around which the differential effects are experienced, including issues of gender, religion, citizenship, generation, and migration status.

3. The ideological nature of the discursive field of the strong state manifested in “authentic nation state” claims.

While posing these focused empirical and theoretical questions of importance to the understanding of human mobility, our reports speak to wider issues. These concern the role of the strong state, the interrelationship between weak and strong states over border issues, and the contexts of globalization.

The reports are also situated in a so far relatively limited policy focussed issue concerning the opportunities and problems that walls offer people. As such, it is intended to be a contribution to the development of social, political, and ecological impact assessments in building walls/fences contexts in the borderlands. Key issues for human sufferings assessments include human rights situation, environment, the nature of mobility of the migrants, and physical displacement. From our reports, we would hope to add to this list the centrality of border barriers. There may also be noted, for example, the bureaucratic hurdles of crossing borders, surveillance mechanisms of checkpoints and borders, or loss of ties. All have varied impacts for different groups.

Mobility is a key. When the border is forcibly closed, migrants are stopped to move. Those whose livelihoods rely on crossing borders are thus threatened with disenfranchisement. At the Mexico-U.S. border, many of the migrants are waiting to enter for a long time. Within the India-Bangladesh context, fences are preventing many Bangladeshi agricultural wage laborers from entering India. It is also evident that fences have divided one family into two, holding two nationalities. This raises important questions concerning the impact of loss of ties. In both U.S.-Mexico and Bangladesh-India borderlands, the effects of physical displacement on the interrelationship between transnational migration and loss of ties are crucial.

The Conceptualizing of the Wall

We have seen that most countries build fences/walls to preserve their “sovereignty”. These examples help to understand the attitude of the strong states toward weak states. They want to exhibit its strength and expand power over the migrants. The borders are heavily guarded
with military power. We have also seen that the wall establishes itself as an expression of nationalism (Alvarez 2012). Severe surveillance and control are imposed on the movement of people and goods and services between the borders. As a result, this creates walls with externality and internality.

Nonetheless, divisions created by the wall undermine human rights and jeopardize security (Alvarez 2012; Heyman 2012). We can hear that walls make it difficult to meet or stay in touch with one’s relatives. The wall-induced binary creates categories like the asylum seeker, refugee, and many illegal immigrants which also creates feelings of helplessness. A border is a wall that creates the “otherness” and the dominant politics catalyzes this process.

Heated statements and gathering of troops between two counties consolidate the wall between them (such as the India-Pakistan border). Bricks and cement are used to build up the wall; language, logic, attack all together create the wall. The strong countries kill people and hang them in their barbed wires, which reinforces their wall (i.e., Bangladesh-India border). Those seeking shelter in the boundaries of the wall are labelled as “outsider,” “terrorist,” “thief,” “smuggler,” and “intruders” (where the security of their own country is irrefutable), this creates the “insider” and “outsider” sense.

We see these examples in the U.S.-Mexico borders, which is also present in other borders of the world. The Rohingyas fleeing Myanmar due to state-sponsored execution and seeking refuge in Bangladeshi border’s no-man’s-land can also be regarded as a wall. Therefore, the walls are not only the distance of the range, this is also the distance between dominant political ideology and the “other” ideology. Whatever may be the case, walls mean division. Through these walls, the arrangements for sustaining the power structures are maintained. In this case, the walls are a sight of oppression (injustice and pride of power). That border becomes a wall for the “other” group, which interrupts their movement.

Control has been imposed on the movements of immigrants from Latin America to Mexico. This means new walls keep growing within existing walls, which in turn raises the level of controls imposed. We face walls between the walls, the walls of multiplicity, political and legal walls, walls of the dominant discourse. The socioeconomic and political ideologies visibilizes the material wall. The powerful states try to invisibilize the weaker states.
Human Rights Violations in the U.S. Southern Border
Roberto Alvarez

This is a summary of the “Written statement submitted by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status.”


This report states that massive and systematic human rights violations are occurring in the United States on the Mexico-U.S. border. U.S. policy is victimizing people fleeing violence, including children through the expansion of immigration detention, the separation of families, and the curtailment of asylum rights. The path for people to the U.S. border face threats of violence from cartels and gangs. Women are especially vulnerable and report threats, sexual violence, and rape. Asylum seekers have experienced physical violence, beatings, kidnaps for ransom, and shootings.

The U.S. Government’s “Migrant Protection Protocols” (MPP) implemented in January 2019, seeks to prevent asylum seekers from entering and remaining in the United States and forces them to stay in Mexico. Migrant families that have been forced to stay in Mexico have been subjected to kidnaps, beatings, and rape, especially at the hands of drug cartels. Asylum seekers are given complex documents that are not explained and are told that visits with attorneys will be at their own cost. Most migrants (especially those from Central America) rarely have funds to pay for private lawyers. In addition, lawyers have documented that U.S. border officials are not asking important questions such as if they are afraid or have reason to be afraid of being returned to Mexico. Under MPP guidelines, exemptions for “vulnerable” people are being ignored as even LGBT asylum seekers have been deported even though they are targeted with violence. Migrants returned to Mexico risk homelessness. Shelters in Mexico are overwhelmed and are at capacity. Thousands of migrants who came during the 2018 migrant caravan remain in Tijuana.

The people who do enter the United States face life-threatening risks from U.S. policy, including the separation of children from their families. The United States is the only country in the world that has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and violated the obligations under international human rights conventions by separating children from their
parents, detention in immigration detention, and in some cases pressuring parents to accept deportation in order to reunite with their children. Approximately 8,000 families were separated from their children at the border.

Forced returns of asylum seekers and push-back on migrants and refugees violate U.S. obligations under the international refugee law and the rights of individual migrants to seek asylum from persecution or credible threats of persecution. Asylum seekers are often detained indefinitely with no chance of parole or release pending delayed hearings. This form of indefinite, arbitrary detention for migrants, asylum seekers, families, and children constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment prohibited under international law.
Human Rights Violations in Palestine

Julie Peteet

The following brief summary of the human rights violations of Palestinians under occupation (in 2019) is based on reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, OCHA (the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and al-Haq (Palestinian Human Rights Organization). Israel has occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem (henceforth Occupied Palestinian Territories or OPTs) for over 50 years.

The illegal occupation systematically discriminates against the indigenous Palestinian population through a complex set of mechanisms and policies of control that include the wall, checkpoints, the permit and identity card system, land confiscations, and house demolition. The context for the current situation is the continuing occupation and the early 1990s policy of closure, which includes the wall and a multitude of checkpoints—both of which hinder mobility and cut off access to health care, education, employment, and social life. In 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN judiciary organ, issued a non-binding advisory opinion determining that Israel's separation wall is illegal, violates international law, and called for its dismantlement. The eight-meter-high wall cuts deeply into the occupied West Bank, dividing communities and separating villages from their cultivated and common-use lands. It severely restricts Palestinian mobility and forms a de facto border. Gates and checkpoints control Palestinian entry and exit. Over 500 checkpoints in the West Bank are a draconian measure to control and monitor Palestinian mobility.

Israeli forces continued to kill Palestinians, including children, during demonstrations in the OPTs, where they posed no imminent threat to life. Israel has failed to ensure accountability and redress for victims. Israeli forces apply an unrestrained shoot-to-kill policy. In some cases, the occupying authorities have obstructed the evacuation of the wounded before they died and did not provide first aid. The great majority of injuries were to the upper parts of the body, indicating excessive use of force. Israeli forces raided Palestinian villages, towns, and cities and settler attacks on Palestinian communities continued apace. The occupying authorities perpetrated arrests, confiscation of property, injuries, house raids and searches, beatings, and torture. The occupying authorities assaulted medical personnel, denied access permits, or permits to receive medical treatment.
The settling of the occupying forces’ civilian population in the OPTs and displacing the local population contravenes international humanitarian law. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states, “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” Israeli settlements in the OPTs are prohibited without exception. The extensive appropriation and destruction of land and property to build and expand settlements contravenes other rules of international humanitarian law.

Under the Hague Regulations of 1907, the public property of the occupied population (e.g., lands, forests, and agricultural estates) is subject to the laws of usufruct. This means that an occupying state is only allowed a very limited use of this property. This limitation is derived from the notion that occupation is temporary, the core idea of the law of occupation. The Hague Regulations prohibit the confiscation of private property. The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the destruction of private or state property, “except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.”

The unlawful appropriation of property by an occupying power amounts to “pillage,” prohibited by both The Hague Regulations and Fourth Geneva Convention and is a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Israel’s building of settlements in the OPTs does not respect any of these rules and exceptions. Furthermore, as explained earlier, the settlements and associated infrastructure are not temporary, do not benefit Palestinians, and do not serve the legitimate security needs of the occupying power. Settlements entirely depend on the large-scale appropriation and/or destruction of Palestinian private and state property, which are not militarily necessary. They are created with the sole purpose of permanently establishing Jewish Israelis on occupied land and thus constitute war crimes.

Jewish settlers, a population of around 600,000 Israelis, have perpetrated attacks on Palestinian homes and pedestrians, leaving many with injuries. They sprayed racist graffiti on walls and vehicles and damaged cars. Israeli settlers made multiple attempts to seize control of Palestinian privately owned land and harassed and prevented them from accessing their land. Israeli settlers have set fire to Palestinian trees and crops, cut down and uprooted trees, and stolen Palestinian harvests.
Israel maintains its illegal land, air, and sea blockade of the Gaza Strip, subjecting its residents to collective punishment and deepening the humanitarian crisis there. The walling/fencing in Gaza has resulted in severe problems with the movement of people and goods, particularly food and medical supplies.

Restrictions on the freedom of movement of Palestinians in the OPT through hundreds of checkpoints and roadblocks continued apace. Accompanying the checkpoint system, the permit system severely limits Palestinian movement within the West Bank and the West Bank and Israel.

Israeli authorities have unlawfully detained in Israel thousands of Palestinians from the OPT, holding hundreds in administrative detention without charge or trial. Torture and other ill-treatment of detainees, including children, have been committed with impunity.

Home demolitions are a form of collective punishment that targets family members of Palestinians suspected or convicted of militant acts against the occupation. They obstruct Palestinian’s ability to build or expand homes and displaced 900 Palestinians in 2019. Most house demolitions are in east Jerusalem and Area C. Many were located in close proximity to Israeli settlements, the wall, planned settlement areas, and Jewish-only bypass roads, or land facing confiscation. The majority of homes were demolished on the grounds of lacking Israeli-issued building permits, which are rarely, if ever, granted. The occupying authorities did not allow most homeowners to evacuate their belongings before the demolitions. During house demolitions, Palestinians were harassed, attacked, or physically assaulted.

The Oslo Accords divide the West Bank in three areas: Area A, about 17% of the West Bank, is composed of Palestinian urban areas where the PA has legal and security privileges. Area B contains Palestinian small towns and villages where Israel maintains the right to conduct military incursions. Area C, 60 percent of the West Bank, Israel maintains full control of security, civilian affairs, and land management. Palestinians are forbidden entry without a permit.
Environmental Impact of Walls
Zahir Ahmed, Julie Peteet, and Reinhard Bernbeck

The Case of Bangladesh: Climate Refugee and Migration

With 80 percent of its densely populated landmass lying near sea level, Bangladesh is often hailed as “ground zero” for climate change. It is predicted that a one-meter rise in sea level could flood almost one-fifth of the country. Some of the most vulnerable coastal districts in Bangladesh—Khulna, Satkhira, and Bagerhat—lie along India’s border and they would be the worst hit. According to the Indian government, the fence is meant to prevent terrorism, smuggling, and “infiltration” into the country. But as climate change forces what could be millions of Bangladeshis from their homes, the fence will also prevent many of them from finding shelter in India. For this reason, it is anticipated that if climate change accelerates, the fence will only increase cross-border tension. As Banerjee (2010) suggests, rather than increase its length, India would do better to abandon its Great Wall (dubbed by the press)—“both as a matter of symbolism and pragmatism.” She has asked, “If India is fencing off its border with Bangladesh, what will that mean for millions of potential climate refugees?”

Many advocates argue that Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change due to a combination of factors including its geographical position, exposure to tropical cyclones and sea level rise (Agrawala et al 2003; Kibria 2017). In addition, climate change coupled with environmental depletion in Bangladesh acts as a push factor that drives people to move. Sarfaraz Alam (2003) shows that the environmental crisis and its impact on people in Bangladesh are a major reason for continued migration to India. He maintains that scarcity of natural resources coupled with environmental change and rapid population growth causes ecological and economic marginalization of the poor. Low economic prospects further spur the people to move toward India where the economic prospects appear to be better.

Banargee warns that if the Asian monsoon becomes harsher and sea levels continue to rise, the fence in its current form will not be able to prevent Bangladeshis from entering India. She also suggests that India should accommodate the climate refugees rather than political refugees and should take steps to plan influx smoothly.
Indo-Bangladesh Borders, Water Resources, and Risk

The context of lowland Bangladesh is one in which rural livelihoods have traditionally been dependent on rivers for irrigation and fishing, yet in some places industrial development and flood management schemes have led to dramatically changed water flow. The complex relationship between water, poverty, and environmental change on the Indo-Bangladesh border has increasingly been interrogated by researchers (Gleick 2000). Like all vital resources, where water is in short supply, access to it tends to follow cleavages of inequality and power. Meanwhile while the management of water resources can play a vital role in economic growth and food security, for example, via large scale irrigation projects, processes of industrialization and urbanization, and the demands these place on rivers, can have the opposite effect, leading to environmental effect either locally or many miles downstream. This leads to conflict between Bangladesh and India and leading to opposition to industrial or hydro-electric projects.

Rivers are thus inherently political, especially in the context of the Indo-Bangladesh border, when the gains (such as increased energy supply or the economic growth stimulated by industrial plants) are not shared by everyone who uses the river. Sometimes the ensuing conflicts cross borders, involving geopolitical tensions or even conflict. This is particularly the case in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna system of the Bengal delta, which is shared between India and Bangladesh (Brichieri-Colombi and Bradnock 2003). Here, changes to river management in upstream India risk profound effects on river flow in downstream Bangladesh, which has historically relied on high levels of irrigation, both from rainfall and its deltaic rivers, for food production.

For instance, Indian plans to construct the Tipaimukh Dam in Assam, close to the border with Northern Bangladesh, have led to fears in Bangladesh of the potentially disastrous environmental effects and water shortages in the Barak River Basin; these in turn feed into nationalist discourse concerning the exploitation of Bangladeshi resources by foreigners. India’s proposed River Linking Project, designed to divert water from flood-prone areas of India to distant arid regions, which some claim would lead to a 20 percent reduction in water resources in Bangladesh, is another example.
When river flow changes the effects on different groups of men and women can be complex. In the Teesta-Bramaputra case, the environmental changes caused by industrialization and the river embankment have meant that irrigation water is no longer freely available during the wet season and mechanized irrigation has become vital for rice production. Water scarcity is thus associated with the increased monetisation of agriculture and new livelihood strategies by the poor (Gardner 2012).

While these observations concern farmers, changes to river flow can have a significant impact on different groups who rely on water for fishing. In the borderland area of North Bengal and Sylhet, the dramatic reduction in seasonal water inundation has meant that the small fish that were once an important component to local diets are no longer available, and the wetlands used primarily by very poor women, men, and children for fishing have disappeared. Meanwhile, the price of fish in the local markets has soared. Once again it is the poorest—often women, children and the old—who experience the impacts of new water scarcities most vividly. Yet while these groups tell of profound environmental changes caused by the infrastructure associated with fences and walls, they have no insurance policy to support their livelihoods. It is alarming to see that neither the Bangladesh government nor the Indian government makes its environmental impact assessments and is not accountable to local communities (Gardner 2012).

While in some cases industrialization has led to dramatic reduction in water supplies, other projects in Bangladesh have involved water management systems aimed at providing increased irrigation for farmers and boosting incomes as well as regional and national food security. The Teesta Barrage in Lalmonirhat, Northern Bangladesh is a prime example. With the first phase completed in 1998, the barrage was designed to provide irrigation for what was known as Bangladesh’s “drought zone.” The Teesta River Floodplain accounts for 14 percent of the total cropped area and 8.5 percent of the population in Bangladesh; the new irrigation opportunities provided by the Barrage thus had a significant impact on national food security.

Village level research in the floodplain indicates that in some areas, improved irrigation has led to a 50 percent increase in crops in the wet season, and significantly higher incomes as well as boosting employment for agricultural laborers and a reported 24 percent increase in wage rates (Islam et al 2003). Uncertainties involving India’s proposed (and highly contested) River-Linking project, which would divert large amounts of water upstream from
the Teesta have, however, led to profound anxieties concerning water supply and the long-term viability of irrigated agriculture, not to say heightened geopolitical tensions. Even were the River Linking Project to be stalled, news reports are increasing that the Teesta’s flow has been dramatically reduced due to upstream dams and other projects in India.

This has had a dramatic effect on local ecologies and the livelihoods of men and women living in borderland areas, who previously relied on the seasonal flows of river water across the land for irrigation, fertilizer (via silt from river water), and fishing. Infrastructure developments and industrialization have had similar effects. In villages close to the Sundarban, which are being used to set up two coal-fired power plants. Over 150 industrial projects are also active upstream of the site, and their associated shipping and dredging activities further threaten its hydrological and ecological dynamics. The hydrological systems, which drive this dynamics, are very large in scale and vulnerable to upstream impacts. The environmental impacts of these establishments, and the way these are located to world’s great mangroves, has been an explosive issue to activists in Bangladesh (Muhammad 2018).

The Environmental Impact of the Walls on Palestine

The Israeli wall around the West Bank threatens local flora and fauna and causes environmental degradation. The wall isolates, fragments and, in some cases, has inflicted significant damage on agricultural land, forests, grasslands, and water resources. Along with the wall, the continued building of settlements and bypass roads are pushing many species of local flora and fauna to the brink of extinction and pose a threat to local biodiversity. Most significantly, the impact of prolonged occupation and its measures to impede Palestinian development and acquire their lands have worked to rupture the ties between the indigenous population and its land and natural resources.

**WATER:** The wall has isolated wells, springs, and cisterns, and damaged or destroyed water infrastructure, especially irrigation networks. Of the 173 affected communities, 60 percent reported that the wall had a negative impact on domestic and/or agricultural water resources. Building the wall has damaged, destroyed, or rendered inaccessible vital sources of water and Israeli restrictions prevent repairs or replacements. Some communities are unable to restore or rehabilitate wells and irrigation networks. Approval from the Israeli Civil Administration in the occupied West Bank is needed for any maintenance activity and/or to bring in
construction materials. As a result, large quantities of water are lost due to leakages in water tanks and damaged pipes. This reduces water use efficiency and thus availability for irrigation.

**WASTE:** In the West Bank, Palestinians are inundated and besieged by unprecedented quantities and types of waste (Stamatopoulou-Robbins 2019). Waste is omnipresent and unavoidable, now part of the very environment usually thought of as distinct from them. Waste siege is thus a feature of the local ecology. The wall has negatively impacted the management of waste disposal for communities located along its route. Over 20 percent of the affected communities reported that the wall either affected their solid waste or their wastewater disposal system. Limited access to sanitary waste disposal services exposes the Palestinian population to health risks and imposes a financial burden. Israeli building and administrative restrictions on the development and implementation of waste management infrastructure projects impedes the establishment of new solid and sewage waste facilities that can help alleviate waste disposal crises. Waste disposal sites behind or close to the wall are now largely inaccessible. Affected communities must now either transport their waste to distant sites at extra cost or burn the waste, releasing toxic emissions and leachate into soil and groundwater. Increased transportation costs give villagers little choice but to burn their garbage.

Sewage and water drainage networks have been affected by the wall construction. Prior to the wall, sewage was discharged at a distance from the community in areas now close to or behind the wall and thus inaccessible for wastewater disposal. Now, affected communities discharge sewage close to the built-up areas and onto lands surrounding villages and thus pollute agricultural lands and pose a health risk to residents. During heavy rains, drainage channels running under the wall often become blocked by debris. However, Palestinians are not permitted to approach the wall to clear blockages due to security restrictions, which causes sewage waste overflow onto adjacent lands. Soil contamination ensues and the health risks of waterborne diseases increases.

According to a B’Tselem report (2017), Israel transfers large amounts of waste to 15 treatment plants in the West Bank in violation of international law. Six of these sites process hazardous waste, posing health and environmental risks for land and population. These sites handle hazardous waste, from biological and medical waste to waste from pharmaceutical and chemical companies to oil, electronic, and metal waste. Israel’s environmental
regulations make the cost of operating waste treatment facilities high; in the occupied West Bank, these regulations are not operative and thus Palestinians and their lands absorb the risks of hazardous waste. Palestinian communities are often forbidden to develop infrastructure, including waste treatment facilities. Palestinians living in the vicinity of these facilities complain of noxious odors and respiratory illnesses.

**BIODIVERSITY:** With over 2,780 flowering plant species, 116 species of mammals, 511 species of birds, and 110 species of reptiles and amphibians, Palestine has a rich biodiversity. As this biodiversity is being degraded, the consequences include food security, health, income generation, and inhabitability. The wall divides, disrupts, and obstructs access to long-standing migratory routes and ecological corridors with a devastating effect on wildlife. The population of land-dwelling mammals larger than a hare, such as wolves, gazelles, hyenas, porcupines, and red foxes, are most at risk. The main impact is on animals who require movement between different territories for feeding, breeding, and nesting sites, especially larger animals who cannot pass through the wall. The larger the animal, the more vulnerable they are. As animals migrate with the seasons, they disperse plant seeds along their path; obstructed migration diminishes biodiversity along these migratory corridors. There is serious concern that this obstruction is driving many species to the brink of extinction. As a result of fragmentation of migratory routes, the wall fosters small pockets of interbreeding micro populations. Excessive inbreeding leads to smaller and less healthy population size and increases vulnerability to extinction. For smaller animals, Israel has opened s-shaped passages through which they can pass.

**DEFORESTATION:** Israeli environmental policies do not include the West Bank. Within Israel one cannot cut down trees in the way that vast areas of the West Bank have been deforested to build settlements and the wall. In addition, settlers have uprooted and set fire to thousands of olive trees in anticipation of expanding into Palestinian lands.

More than 82 km² of protected areas and up to 39.7 km² of forested area are included in the wall zone. Natural heritage sites now isolated behind the wall pose a physical barrier preventing many species of animals from traveling to sources of food and mates and thus endangering their survival. Al-Mughayyir Forest, in the northern West Bank, covers an area of approximately 3,400 dunums. Wall construction separated the forest into two isolated landscapes. The tree cover along the path of the wall has been reduced. Around 45 percent of
the forest has been degraded, destabilizing natural processes and causing habitat loss, important components of Palestinian natural heritage.

Conservation management of parks and forests are prohibited in the wall zone. For example, Umm Al-Rihan Forest covers an area of approximately 3,600 dunums and is on UNESCO’s tentative list of natural heritage sites. A dense natural forest of oak and mastic trees, it is rich in biodiversity. It is part of a migratory route for threatened avian species. Now the forest is completely isolated by the wall and inaccessible for Palestinians making conservation, management, and sustainable development actions impossible.

Another aspect of environmental degradation concerns herbicides. The Israeli military has “weaponized the wind” (Molavi 2020); it waits for the wind to be blowing in Gaza’s direction to spray toxic herbicides in cultivated areas along the border. This is part of “farm warfare.” Assaults on Palestinian agriculture is a means to damage livelihoods as these herbicides kill plants and turn areas once covered in vegetation into deserts. Desertification along the border renders it uninhabitable for Palestinians.

**Long-Term Effects**

Walls do not only destroy ecological diversity; in some cases, they can also have the opposite effect. Both on the border between former East and West Germany and in the so-called demilitarized zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea, rare animals and plants whose habitats have been significantly encroached upon by humans have settled over time. This long-term effect of some separation walls went for a long time unnoticed. In the case of Germany, environmental activists identified a large number of animals and plant species in the vicinity of the now open wall that had found a convenient niche during the approximately 40 years of the wall's existence and could live there undisturbed by people. With some effort by citizens' initiatives, a protected “Green Belt” was created in place of the former wall. This transformation of the former “Iron Curtain” into a nature preserve happened in the mid-1990s and is now administered by the EU in a top-down fashion (Kortelainen 2010). In Germany, the “Green Belt” is almost 1400 km (70 miles) long and between 30 meters and 1 kilometer wide. An investigation of the belt’s southern part found that 48.8 percent of this land had become a refuge for endangered species. The former deadly separation line had turned into a shelter for birds, mammals, and smaller animals as well as all kinds of plants. This is
particularly noticeable in regions with intensive agriculture on both sides of the former wall. Another effect, however, is that mobile animals such as deer still turn around to “their” territory when they come close to the former borders. This must be the effect of transgenerational mediation in these animals as deer hardly ever reach an age of 15 years or beyond (Heurich et al. 2015).

The Berlin Wall, largely kept free of vegetation, had other consequences for animals. On one hand, there were the well-known "wall hares." These wild hares thrived on the former death strip and rapidly multiplied in numbers because the border guards were forbidden to shoot them. Allegedly the little animals also dug their way under the wall. Dogs also populated the death strip, but in the service of the state, as guard dogs. A total of 6000 dogs were leashed on 100-meter-long chains in the death strip and were supposed to discover potential escapees and attack them. These poorly treated animals, living without much contact to other dogs or even humans, could only with great difficulty be placed in adoption in the course of the opening of the wall, as the general public considered them to be dangerous.

Perhaps even more accentuated than Germany’s Green Belt is the mined strip between North and South Korea, where a unique ecological niche has also formed. Despite the immense safety apparatus on both sides, shy animal species find a suitable habitat due to the absence of humans in this “demilitarized zone” (DMZ). Dozens of endangered mammals and bird species live in the 160 by 2.5-mile zone. Kim and Cho (2005) analyze the strip’s wetland, forest, and grassland ecosystems and call them ecosystem treasure houses to be recognized internationally (14).

It could seem as if a deathbelt for humans represented a welcome lifebelt for fauna and flora (Coates 2014: 505). However, this assessment does not take into account initial large-scale damage from building walls and fencing of no-go-zones, nor does it take a close look at side effects such as flooding and erosion provoked by these attempts at cutting the move of people.
Walls, Infectious Diseases, and Heterogeneous Immunological Landscapes

Fabian Crespo

City walls were erected since the emergence of villages, and the earliest settlements that archaeological studies reveal as “cities” are also the earliest settlements to have been walled, and in some early civilizations “wall” and “city” were interchangeable concepts and one word could stand for the other (Tracy 2000). These historical city walls present a functional diversity reflecting economic, military, and ecological dimensions (Reinhard 2020), and during epidemics walls served also to protect from “invading diseases” and to isolate or quarantine the sick or contagious individuals. As recently pointed out by Alison Bashford “Quarantine was and is about borders, from household to city borders to national borders” (Bashford 2020). During the COVID-19 pandemic,8 the immunological concept of “herd immunity” is one of the global objectives to achieve as soon as possible, where immunized and non-immunized individuals are truly erecting invisible barriers or walls within populations. However, if not properly planned and controlled, health borders or walls, quarantines, or herd immunity can create not only inhumane and unworkable responses but divisive and dangerous heterogenous social and immunological landscapes.

In this essay, we will try to “make the past pandemics present,”9 exploring different historical epidemics and pandemics where either real walls (city walls and institution walls) or virtual walls (immunized and non-immunized populations) can generate heterogenous biosocial and immunological landscapes that in many cases were highly permeable or dangerously generated unequal infected and immunological spaces. We will explore and discuss walls and infectious diseases at three different levels: city walls, institution/building walls, and “immunological walls.” To address and explore these three levels, the essay will be divided in three parts: 1) How medieval plague and leprosy can show us that city walls represented highly permeable barriers for infectious diseases; 2) How walls from quarantine stations or

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8 This text is being written during the Covid-19 pandemic and early stages of global vaccination (February 2021)
9 Christos Lynteris recently suggested that we should be careful when exploring the epidemiological narratives of “the lessons of past epidemics”, and we should seriously embrace the “lived experience of the historical impact of epidemics in the past” and ultimately ask how do these communities or individuals make the past pandemics present? Lynteris C. 2020. “Didactic Historicism and the Historical Consciousness of Epidemics.” Somatosphere March 6: http://somatospherenet/forumpost/didactic-historicism-historical-consciousness-epidemics/.
lazarettos represented a temporary and partially effective measure for isolation but ultimately generated unequal and inhumane infectious diseases pools or landscapes; 3) How immunity or immunized clusters of people can generate “virtual” or “invisible” walls or borders, especially when understanding population-scale immunity or “herd immunity.”

I. City walls as permeable barriers: lessons from plague and leprosy in medieval Europe.

Perhaps one of the most paradigmatic and dramatic representations of walls and infectious diseases is the one portrayed by a lawyer from Piacenza (Italy) during the XIV century, when describing the siege of the Christian city of Caffa by the Tartars. Gabriele de’Mussis wrote c1348:

The dying Tartars, stunned and stupefied by the immensity of the disaster brought about by the disease, and realizing that they had no hope of escape, lost interest in the siege. But they ordered corpses to be placed in catapults and lobbed into the city in the hope that the intolerable stench would kill everyone inside. What seemed like mountains of dead were thrown into the city, and the Christians could not hide or flee or escape from them, although they dumped as many bodies as they could in the sea.

While controversial and disputed, de’Mussis story was for many years (centuries) one of the principal sources on the origin of the Black Death and how entered Western Europe when plague-infected Genoese escaped on boats to different Mediterranean ports. Probably, his story is secondhand and is uncorroborated but still the dramatic image of throwing corpses over the city walls of Caffa could have happened (Wheelis 2002). Wheelis pointed out that this event has probably constituted only one of several paths of infected ships or boats.

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10 Now Feodosia, also called Theodosia, in Crimea.
12 As recently reexamined, de’Mussis was not well informed about the events in the Black Sea, and, interestingly, dating some of his notary documents reveals that he did not leave Piacenza while the Siege of Caffa in 1347 (Barker 2021)
leaving the region into Western Europe, and he also considered that the Caffa’s episode suggests that biological warfare was used at the siege of Caffa (2002).

Still, we must also consider other routes or alternatives when explaining how the plague gets into Caffa, bypassing the city walls. It has been proposed (and also disputed) that the plague pathogen might have entered the city not by catapulted infected cadavers but by rodent-to-rodent transmission from Mongol encampments into the city (Wheelis 2002). Hymes also disputed the identity of the infected intruder, where it is unlike that rats were being able to live for extended times as stable carrier-populations for the plague pathogen, and we need to identify a local, more stable, animal reservoir that could have ultimately infected rats or humans (2014). Perhaps, when trying to solve how a microbial pathogen overcame the thick city walls of Caffa, we should not forget one carrier: walking humans. Barker reminds us that corpses or severed heads were catapulted into besieging cities as a way to terrorized their habitants more than using a bioterrorist strategy, and perhaps after a long hunger, due to the siege, the entrance of plague pathogen occurred when humans (and rodents?) were allowed to re-enter the city with food supplies after the siege was over (2021).

The siege of Caffa, as many other Mongol sieges (Figure 1), left us a dramatic legacy in written texts over generations, teaching and reminding us many lessons, but one especially, the one that is showing us that microbial pathogens have many ways to overcome or bypass fortified walls.

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13 *Yersinia pestis*
Two years before de’Mussis dramatic Caffa’s narrative, in England, King Edward III ordered to remove all lepers[^14] from within the walls of London, where victims of the infection were to leave the city for the countryside, and anyone who dares to offer them shelter in the city was threatened with forfeiture (Rawcliffe 2006). The common understanding (perhaps a misinterpretation) that alleged that most lepers were confined to live outside the medieval city walls probably originated from the Old Testament, where it was presumed that “lepers” should live “outside the camp.” Interestingly, Rawcliffe proposes three reasons for the suburban setting of most leper houses[^15]: religious belief, practical necessity, and political aspiration (2013). However, the dates and places where lepers were expelled and pushed to live outside the city walls varied from place to place (Magilton 2008).

Probably due to the increased prevalence of leprosy in Medieval Europe it was necessary the introduction of large-scale institutional care in the form of leprosy hospitals or leprosaria (Figure 2), where the status and organization of such institutions also varied in time and space. Moreover, unlike monastic institutions, there was not a regular plan or predefined layout for leprosy hospitals (Roffey 2012). The heterogeneous organization of such institutions probably had impact on diet, sanitation, treatment, and daily life (Roffey 2012). Not only institutional differences were observed during the peak of leprosy in Medieval

[^14]: The proper biomedical terminology is *Hansen’s disease*, and we agree on addressing the issue to stop using the term or word *leprosy* for contemporary populations. During the last century, many researchers advocated for removing the word leprosy from the medical literature, and recently Lancet Infectious Diseases published a personal view on that issue (Deps and Cruz 2020). Due to our historical approach, we use the historical terminology of leprosy.

[^15]: Medieval institutions associated with the care of lepers were also known or described as leprosaria or leper hospitals.
Europe, but regional differences in attitudes toward people with leprosy were also common (Brenner 2010; Dematrie 2007; Rawcliffe 2006; Roberts 2011).

Leprosy in medieval Europe is teaching one valuable lesson, there wasn’t a monolithic or uniform social and sanitary response across Europe, and new research is showing an emerging heterogeneous social landscape for responses and attitudes towards leprosy. We can argue that city walls did not have a defensive mechanism or sanitary function to stop potential migrants or intruders as leprosy disease carriers (as described for plague), just the other way around, in some towns and cities the infected individuals were expelled from within the society and pushed outside the city walls or live at the city gates. But still, as Rawcliffe pointed out, lepers were not totally separated from the medieval community, where in some towns and cities they were allowed to enter towns (following specific rules) to purchase food, visit shrines, or simply beg for charity (Rawcliffe 2013). As indicated by Touati, we face an “anachronistic view of contagion of leprosy to the entire course of the Middle Ages” (1999, 198), and the author moves forward the idea of the wrong perception of leprosy and lepers during the Middle Ages. He linked the creation of such specific communities with the “revolution of charity” in the eleventh century, where “leprosy offered a positive opportunity for redemption and sanctification” (Touati 1999, 199). An important lesson is to recognize leper-houses, leper-hospitals, or leprosaria as an expansion of the city, where the city walls were not a simple division to isolate people.

II. Institutional Walls as Public Health Responses: Quarantine Stations and Lazarettos

Quarantine may be defined as the temporary restraint or segregation of people who may come into contact with transmissible pathogens (Conti 2008). As described above, the idea of isolating people that could be contagious or “impure” can be traced back to the Old Testament, where in Leviticus [13.46] it is stated that individuals with leprosy must live outside the camp. Interestingly, quarantine was implemented in different ways during human
history, and it is argued that the term and idea of quarantine become part of the modern lexicon during medieval plague outbreaks in Europe (Sehdev 2002). Moreover, it is considered that quarantine rationales and justification for a segregative response have changed dramatically as the problems that quarantine produced over time (Bashford 2020). As indicated by Bashford, centuries ago quarantine faced problems (and opposition) because of commercial consequences, ships stranded in limbo, travel bans, and the unhealthy concentration of contagious risk individuals in segregated spaces (2016; 2020). Ideally, for an operational quarantine, we should know the biological mechanisms of the infection and contagion process, but in the past most cases dealt with the absence or clear understanding of the length and therapeutic intervention of quarantines, ultimately complicating the perception and compliance of quarantine rules (Conti 2008). Between the 16th and 18th centuries an increased number of quarantine stations was observed (mostly maritime), but there was a long way to go until all quarantine stations will share international rules that will follow more universal scientific and international laws (Conti 2008). Interestingly, Witt recently wrote that quarantines at U.S. ports shaped the commerce of the era, offering some protection against the introduction of disease from remote regions, but he also added that

> Politically, they (quarantines) were made easier by the simple fact that their principal targets had little claim to be represented in local politics. On land, by contrast, quarantines, detentions, and other heavy-handed acts of state authority produced far more controversy because they affected citizens and residents… (2020, 37)

*lazarettos* were one of the most paradigmatic institutions where quarantine was observed and instituted during medieval and post-medieval plague outbreaks in Europe. The history of lazarettos (especially in Europe) is very rich and diverse. The Senate of the Serenissima Republic, founded back in 1423, one of the first lazarettos in the central lagoon of Venice, Italy (Figure 3). This institution was intended to work as a hospital (one of the first) for quarantine and treatment of plague-infected people. But most lazarettos functioned as a mixture of quarantine stations or isolation of infected individuals (or individuals that were

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16 Different infectious diseases such as plague, cholera, yellow fever, malaria, smallpox have different transmission mechanisms and incubation periods.

17 [https://www.lazzarettovecchio.it/history](https://www.lazzarettovecchio.it/history) (last visit 10/30/20)
potentially exposed to the disease), and sadly, more than two-thirds of the patients confined at Lazarretto Vecchio died on the premises (Snowden 2019).

The creation of such institutions requested a complex existence of different conditions such as sanitary policies for humans, goods, and how to avoid infection spread within and outside the quarantine station or lazaretto walls. Dubrovnik was one of the first medieval cities to organize a pesthouse or lazaretto to fight plague outbreaks starting in 1377. But as pointed out by Sabine Fabijanec, still in the 15th century Dubrovnik did not have a resolute policy toward the plague problem, where short-term economic interest overcame long-term solutions to fight the disease (Fabijanec 2008). Toward the end of 16th century, more strict sanctions and uniform policies were established, but the protection was more oriented towards maritime commerce, and not too much land transport (Fabijanec 2008). From the mid-18th century, still, the lazarettos that had been erected in so many different Mediterranean ports came to demarcate “a major epidemiological frontier that coincided with an apparent civilizational barrier” (Chase-Levenson 2016, 36). Initially, most lazarettos administration and physical imprint followed centuries of heterogeneous local traditions, and finally by the 19th century, most lazarettos tried to incorporate more standardized traditions shared throughout Europe (Chase-Levenson 2016).

Recently, when studying the pest-house imaginaries in medieval and post-medieval Europe, Carmichael suggested that historians should interrogate “…plague’s spatial and temporal silences, to see something other than our traditional storied narratives, in which human actions lead to plague outcomes” (2021). Clearly, from an immunological and microbiological perspective, we should embrace a biosocial approach when understanding past and present epidemics and explore how differential spatial and temporal landscapes can lead to differential health outcomes. Roffey described that, unlike monastic medieval institutions, there was not a regular plan or predefined layout for leprosy hospitals (2012):
and Crawshaw described that authorities implementing early modern quarantines developed a variety of strategies that also complicate any attempt to provide a single definition of the policy (2016).

The history of quarantine stations and lazarettos should be revisited (and the term “quarantine” should not be confused with physical distance and self-isolation). The Covid-19 pandemic is pushing us to revise the implementation of quarantine beyond quarantine stations. We should consider (or start the discussion) that modern quarantine stations (as old lazarettos) are no longer viable for an entire city or modern urban societies, where the globalized and interconnected world makes quasi-impossible to sustain long periods of “truly isolation” for most members of the society. If quarantines will be applied in a future pandemic or environmental catastrophe, we must think a global strategy, where to recognize that different continents or regions have different biosocial contexts and explore how different factors (beyond biology) generate heterogeneous social landscapes that ultimately generates equally heterogeneous biological and immunological landscapes. We must be careful and avoid *walling* people in quarantine stations (as lazarettos in the past) where they generate unjustly, socially biased, and inhumane clusters of sick people, that ultimately could exacerbate the incubation and spread of highly contagious diseases.

**III. Building Immunological Walls and Passports: The Potential (and Dangerous) Return to an Immunoprivilege Culture?**

The immune system responds to infection through two complex mechanisms: the cellular response, which is commonly associated with the innate immune response and involves white blood cells (called phagocytes) that recognize, engulf, and destroy microbial pathogens; and the humoral response, which is commonly associated with the acquired immune response, and involves the recognition of microbial antigens, secretion of antibodies, and initiation of immunological “memory.” The acquired (also called adaptive) immune system is set up to remember most microbial pathogens that we encounter during our lifetime. These two responses (innate and acquired) work in concert and effectively protect us from infection through a complex multilayered network of cooperation that sometimes blurs the distinction between innate and acquired responses (Danilova 2008). A type of immune cells: *B*

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18 Antigens can be defined as molecules (commonly present in bacteria and other non-self particles or organisms) that contain distinct sites or epitopes that are recognized and interact with various components of the immune system (from https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/medicine-and-dentistry/antigen)
lymphocytes when activated by a microbial pathogen will go through a cellular transformation and produce a different cohort of cells commonly called a) the “short-lived” plasma cells that will produce a huge amount of antibodies (to fight back an active infection), and b) the “long-lived” plasma cells that will take-up residence in the bone marrow and will retain the “recipe” to manufacture antibodies, providing the lifelong immunity to subsequent infections (Sompayrac 2008).

During the current Covid-19 pandemic the term immunity captured a lot of attention, at the individual and community level (population-scale immunity or “herd immunity”). Immunity or “immunization” of humans19 can create population clusters, where virtual immunological walls are erected dividing the populations into two groups: who is immune and who is not. However, we must consider that, in many cases, immunity in individuals and populations starts waning over time, where different factors can influence how long immunity will last (Ahmed and Gray 1996; Antia et al 2018).

We are still confronting the Covid-19 pandemic20 and we do not have yet the final outcome (and when) of this global pandemic and crisis. We do not know yet when and how we will be able to achieve population-scale immunity and how this “presumed” immunity could concentrate political and economic power (Kofler and Baylis 2020), and perhaps generating more powerful and divisive walls than city walls in ancient cities or quarantine stations. Yellow fever epidemics in the past could teach us a valuable lesson, or at least warn us, on the consequences of erecting these immunological virtual walls.

At the end of 18th century, a series of outbreaks/epidemics of yellow fever21 spread through different cities and ports in the United States. At that time, the medical tradition linked climate and disease, suggesting that the “unacclimated stranger/foreign” was more susceptible to the infection (Carrigan 2015). In the 1700s, mostly in the Caribbean and American south, there was a “rite of passage” to become “acclimated” to the fevers, and especially yellow fever received the reputation as a “stranger’s disease.” The acclimated idea soon expanded into the longtime Gulf Coast residents, but the idea that immunity can be passed over generations was dangerous and incorrect (Keith 2012). In the late 1800s and

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19 Active immunity can be generated by direct exposure to the pathogen or immunization by vaccines.
20 February 2021.
21 Infectious disease produced by a virus (Flavivirus) that is transmitted human to human by a mosquito bite.
based on high mortality during new outbreaks, the idea of that all exposed/infected people acquired immunity\textsuperscript{22} was challenged and questioned by the local community, and clinical data showed that some individuals previously acclimated lost their immunity (Crosby 2006).

As described by Carrigan, physicians facing yellow fever outbreaks in Louisiana also feared that early exposure to the infection did not guarantee full lifelong immunity; moreover, it was suggested that mild first infections did not generate the same degree of future protection as severe cases (2015).

As recently revisited by Olivarius, the idea of acclimation during yellow fever outbreaks in New Orleans led to the acquisition of a significant “immunocapital,” where an individual developing lifelong immunity had access to previously inaccessible realms of economic, political, and social power (2019). But as described by Olivarius, “victory” through acclimation was reserved for whites only:

> For whites, immunity was a prerequisite for citizenship and social advancement; for blacks, immunity increased their monetary value to their owners and strengthened the cycle of racialized assumptions about the black body that bolstered racial slavery.

> Black people could thus possess immunity, but not immunocapital, an expedient feint of logic that whites used to enrich themselves and reinforce their social and political dominance over blacks.\textsuperscript{23}

As proof of this acclimation, or acquisition of immunity, different certificates or immunity cards were produced in different states in the United States (Figure 4). Interestingly, during the current Covid-19 pandemic, a similar certificate was brought to consideration and discussion: immunity passports. Some countries (initially Chile, Italy, UK) had suggested the production of “immunity passports” or “risk-free certificates,” based on the

\textsuperscript{22} Individuals that during early life were exposed to mild infections.

detection of antibodies to the microbial pathogen SARS-Cov-2.\textsuperscript{24} In April 2020, the World Health Organization issued a scientific brief pointing that “there is not enough evidence about the effectiveness of antibody-mediated immunity to guarantee the accuracy of an ‘immunity passport’ or ‘risk-free certificate’” (WHO 2020). Immediately, different researchers brought to our attention the cost and benefits of such a solution, especially when allowing the return to “safe” travel and slow reopening of the economy. Kofler and Baylis presented “Ten reasons why immunity passports are a bad idea,” where from an immunological perspective includes that we are still trying to understand the type of immunity generated by Sars-Cov-2 and who will be able to generate immunity and for how long (2020).

Clearly, immunological passports will immediately correlate with immunological “invisible” walls, where separate who is potentially immune and who is not; and beyond immunological uncertainties, the immunological passports could create coercive and stigmatizing social environments, ending in new marginalized groups and discrimination (Brown et a. 2020; Kofler and Baylis 2020). As pointed out by Alvarez in this AAA Task Force, an essential theme is the political-ideology that drives “the increased separation, and ‘othering’ of people and territories in and along borders and borderlands” (Alvarez 2020). We should be aware that emerging immunity landscapes could also contribute to and exacerbate the “othering” of people.

Phelan described that when large-scale travel resumes, countries might also require travelers to provide evidence of immunity, and we must be sure that all travel certificates follow standardized health criteria, be non-discriminatory, and consider the human rights of travelers (2020). These new immunological passports will enforce new regulations at regional and international checkpoints, and, as clearly also stated in this AAA Task Force by Peteet, at checkpoints “social orders and hierarchies such as race, ethnicity, class, nationality, and religion are at work” (2020). Should we be concerned that “health status” in a post-pandemic world will be a new commodity? Brown and colleagues proposed that the choice is not between returning to a normal life versus issuing immunity passports, they suggest that periodic lockdowns with temporary immunity passports could be potentially valuable (2020). However, as presented at the beginning of this piece, there is a complex process associated with acquired immunity and not all is explained by biological factors. We must embrace an emerging discipline such as ecological immunology and propose a more comprehensive

\textsuperscript{24} Virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19)
definition of immunity and understand that the individual capacity to generate a proper immune response (“immune competence”) is also influenced by environmental and social factors as well (French et al 2009; McDade 2003; 2005). When trying to understand differential mortality during plague outbreaks in medieval Europe, we proposed the existence of heterogeneous immunological landscapes where, due to biological, ecological, and social factors, not all populations and nations presented the same immune competence (Crespo and Lawrenz 2014). The same immunological scenario is still developing when connecting how biological and social disparities are seen among populations today. Simply put, we cannot expect or predict that all populations or regions will have the capacity to generate the same type of immunity or mount a long-lasting immunity when exposed to similar microbial pathogens.

If we do not follow proper health international guidelines and we do not recognize how dynamic and globally heterogeneous is acquired immunity, individuals will assume that they will be fully immune to a second infection, or perhaps worse, they will ignore how they will continue spreading the disease and increase the risk of global transmission.

Also, in this AAA Task Force, Heyman reported that:

Physical barriers, including walls, without sensors or cameras, are passive obstacles. They may dissuade some casual crossers, but empirical analysis has shown that long-distance migrants persistently attempt to cross heavily enforced borders (Heyman, 2020, p.1)

and, from a microbiological perspective, we could easily replace “casual crossers” or “long-distance migrants” by “microbial pathogens.” We must recognize that immunological passports and quarantine stations are temporary solutions, and, if implemented, it should follow international health and human rights protocols, where to establish a clear and honest interplay between state rules and civic responsibilities. We should re-visit the meaning and implementation of health borders, quarantines, and population-scale immunity. We must also embrace a more comprehensive understanding of “immune competence,” if not, microbial pathogens will show us (again) that immunological passports, quarantines, and health borders could easily mimic and reflect the “fragility” of the ancient walls of Caffa or medieval lazarettos.
Overall Conclusion

This report emphasizes the catastrophic and negative aspects of the regions in which borders/walls and fences have been constructed. Yet it is crucial to recall that these are also places people call “home,” and in which daily lives are lived. Borders need to be viewed as social systems in which communities are built on specific local strategies through kinship, economy, local politics and the connections between both sides of national demarcations. Here we focus on two of the longest border/wall/fence regions of the world: The U.S.-Mexico and Bangladesh-India borders. As in the Israel-Palestine border, these walled/fenced demarcations are not socially or culturally uniform but exhibit difference, diversity, and specific types of creativity. This includes cultural production of music, language idioms, and regional/local lifestyles. Although border scholarship has focused on the illegal mechanisms and strategies utilized by drug traffic and other illicit behavior, people who live and know the border are skillful actors in avoiding security and surviving through strategic action.

Similarly, our disciplinary perspectives/tropes often inadvertently omit recognizing and including new and unknown border/wall forms such as those described above in reference to infectious diseases and quarantine.

Recommendations to AAA

The global phenomenon of walls, borders, and checkpoints serve as obstacles to mobility, constitute a violation of human rights, and often inflict environmental damage. The Association takes a formal stand on an issue when the cause in question matches certain objective criteria and when members feel deeply concerned about an issue. We are of the opinion that, in terms of these principles, there is a substantial case for the Association to take action on the intertwined mechanisms to impede human mobility. In the broadest sense, the commitment to human rights is under threat and obstacles to human movement are inflicting harm and suffering.

The Association has a long history of taking stances on issues relevant to the anthropological community, including voicing concern about the Vietnam War, anthropological work for the U.S. military, LGBT issues, and racial equality. The AAA currently boycotts states and cities with antisodomy laws, weak labor laws, Native American sports mascots, and discriminatory immigration laws. In addition, it boycotts Coca-Cola products due to its labor practices in Colombia, and hotels with lax environmental practices. The Association has filed legal briefs
in support of marriage equality and affirmative action, among others. Moreover, the
Association has taken public positions on a number of political issues, including, but not
limited to the embargo of Cuba; indigenous rights in Peru, Honduras, Colombia and other
countries; the Israel/Palestine situation; the interdiction of Haitian refugees in the United
States; South African apartheid; the CIA; the U.S. military in Iraq; HIV intervention; and war
crimes in former Yugoslavia.

The charge to the Task Force was to:

a. Consult the scholarly literature to arrive at and prepare a written summary of a consensus
definition of “border wall” and “security wall.”

b. Prepare relevant evidence that documents the global proliferation of border and security
walls, as well as their impact.

c. Produce a report to the membership that summarizes the evidence it has reviewed and the
implications for key policy recommendations.

d. Consider possible recommendations for action the Association might take on the issue of
walls and security barriers.

e. Explore the feasibility of preparing engagingly illustrated materials for public
consumption.

In developing policies and actions around walls, borders and checkpoints, we suggest the
following four framing principles:

1. Human Rights

A commitment to human rights: The Association should consider taking a stand wherever
fundamental human rights are systematically violated. The AAA’s Declaration on
Anthropology and Human Rights states that “the AAA has long been, and should continue to
be, concerned whenever human difference is made the basis for a denial of basic human
rights,” and it affirms the Association’s “commitment to the equal opportunity of all cultures,
societies and persons” to realize their human potential. The statement also references the UN
Declaration of Human Rights, which contains a more detailed enumeration of universal
rights. Most relevant to the task at hand are the “the right to life, liberty and security of
person” (Article 3), the right to freedom from “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment” (Article 5), the right to “equal protection of the law” (Article 7), freedom from
“arbitrary detention, arrest or exile” (Article 9), and the right to “freedom of movement within the borders of each state” and “the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country“ (Article 13), and everyone has the “right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” (Article 14).

2. The Anthropocene

In this age, the AAA must recognize that large-scale human migration from the Global South to the Global North is well underway and will continue for the foreseeable future. Climate changes, on top of deep inequalities, will propel more and more movement northward. Mobility is a widespread characteristic of human adaptation, while walls and enforced enclosure attempt to keep people in their place. This is inappropriate and perhaps fruitless, but with much suffering.

Walls and fences from the Mexico-U.S. border to the wall in Palestine to barriers between India and Bangladesh have serious environmental consequences, including human interactions (practical and meaningful) with water, plants, animals, and sacred sites in the landscape and ecology. Such effects are of particular concern for anthropologists.

3. Anthropological Ethics

We as anthropologists have a commitment to the peoples whom we study. The AAA statement on ethics says that, while all anthropologists have an obligation to “do no harm” in their research, many “choose to link their research to the promotion of well-being, social critique or advocacy.” Many anthropologists feel an ethical and professional obligation to bear witness to human suffering and seek to intervene to prevent further suffering.

A critical awareness of the roles and actions of the U.S. government in obstructing and punishing mobility thus contravening articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As the American Anthropological Association, we should be particularly sensitive to policies and practices that inflict harm and suffering.

4. Actionability

The Task Force recognizes the applied, activist, and academic dimensions of anthropology. This report has framed the issues we feel are relevant to anthropology and to the AAA as an association of anthropologists.
Courses of Action

This report recommends a range of general and specific courses of action available to the AAA Executive Board including the following:

• A commitment to human rights and the right to seek asylum

• A commitment to advocate for migrants and refugees, minorities, disadvantaged groups, and indigenous groups

• A critical awareness of U.S. actions in obstructing mobility, violating human rights, and contributing to climate change

Possible courses of action the Executive Board could consider include:

1. No Action, a possibility we do not recommend.

2. Issue a statement of concern and condemnation.

3. Develop a series of internal, external, international, and formal actions.

1. NO ACTION: The gravity of the situation on the U.S. border and along the wall in Israel-Palestine, and the widespread concern over these situations among AAA members is such that the Task Force recommends against inaction.

2. STATEMENT OF CONCERN AND CONDEMNATION

In the past the Association has issued statements condemning South African apartheid, the invasion of Iraq, and the illegal trade in antiquities. A statement condemning governmental wall building would be in line with such precedents. The Task Force supports a statement of censure or concern but, in view of the gravity of the situation and the level of concern felt by many within the Association, this would in our view be an insufficient course of action if it were the only action undertaken.

3. POTENTIAL COURSES OF ACTION

An awareness of leverage: Attempts to intervene in public debates or on behalf of social causes are most effective, and the obligation to intervene most powerful, where the Association has some leverage: professional knowledge relevant to the debate or resources
whose withdrawal or deployment could be expected to have an impact. In weighing whether to intervene and, if so, what kind of intervention to undertake, the Executive Board should consider not only the intrinsic merits of the case, but also the underlying principles laid out here.

1) Internal

1.1. Pursue Research Themes (PhDs and team research) such as:
  • Trauma of victims (memory studies/biological anthropology)
  • Material traces of migration/walls through history
  • Anthropology of “waiting to cross” (e.g., emergence of camps, policing)
  • Anthropology of border institutions/police
  • Support research into longer term issues connected to forced migration (e.g., in the sense of structurally forced out of a place by ecological deterioration, poverty, health issues)

1.2. Promote research mentioned above by making walls and borders the main theme of a AAA meeting.

1.3. Promote and support an activist anthropology that protects asylum seekers and defends their rights.

1.4 Compile a database of expert witnesses from anthropology for court cases involving asylum seekers. Amicus Curiae (“friend of the court”) brief is where a legal opinion, expert testimony, or scholarly research findings are used to introduce concerns in a legal proceeding by someone who is not directly a party to the proceeding, has not been invited by any of the parties to the proceeding to assist the court, but has information that has a bearing on the case. The Association has, on certain occasions, offered an amicus brief based on research findings that have been published in our journals.

1.5. Form a committee that produces a set of clear rules by which to judge whether measures by some government should be considered “inhumane,” leading to action by AAA such as a formal protest.

1.6 Suggest the creation of an AAA committee (Walls/Borders and Human Health) that could work in collaboration with WHO/CDC or other local/international health agencies. Due to the current pandemic crisis and those yet to come, we must rethink how different local and
international agencies will share data and cooperate when implementing different plans of action.

1.7 Funding/supporting local or international projects that will explore how walls/borders can exacerbate health disparities between regions or populations, and how ultimately those disparities can result in or exacerbate global catastrophic events such as the Covid-19 pandemic.

1.8. Funding/supporting local or international projects that explore the long-term and deleterious environmental impact of barriers, walls, and fences.

1.9 Encourage research and education on trauma associated with border enforcement, including effects on vulnerable groups such as children.

1.10 Promote and encourage publication of journal special issues on borders and walls.

1.11 Coordinate with other academic associations’ platforms and actions.

1.12 Research, Education, and Outreach. The following are some of the activities the Task Force encourages the AAA to support:

- Undertake a public education initiative (comparable to the Race: Are We So Different? and World on the Move™ initiatives)
- Maintain an up-to-date library and/or bibliography of relevant sources
- Apply to SSRC and Wenner-Gren to provide support for ongoing conferences
- Support comparative work; identify understudied border walls/enclosures and publicize to members
- Establish a borders unit (like Human Rights Committee) or a section
- Encourage policy-oriented research; ethnographies of policy
- Create an interactive website of walls and emerging walls; checkpoint experiences
- Create and distribute teaching modules on walls and borders for K-12
- Support engaged, activist anthropology

2) External/Outreach

2.1. Info materials for communities from AAA
2.2. Exhibits

2.3. Promote a “Global Action Day against Walls.”

2.4. Generalized awareness raising that mobility from Global South to Global North is here to stay in the anthropocene

2.5. Reach out to other anthropology societies (in archaeological fields: SAA, WAC, EAA) for common support of research on walls

2.6. Support of “citizen science” that works on the basis of respect for migrants and their rights

2.7. Support funding opportunities for high schools and colleges to organize workshops on walls/borders and the impact on human mobility, exclusion, ecological deterioration, and health disparities

3) Formal Politics

3.1. U.S. Politics

- Provide printed information, including our report, to Congress about the wall at the U.S.-Mexico border (a) as a humanitarian crisis; (b) as a social disaster for local communities; (c) as an ecological disaster; (d) as economic waste, and (e) as a violation of human rights.

- Call on relevant agencies of the U.S. government to work toward effective changes in U.S. government policies and practices.

- Systematic collection of data by federal institutions on (a) numbers and causes of death at the border; (b) medical emergencies after border crossing; (c) long-term problems from crossing; (d) immediate dissolution of all collective and single detention of people who illegally cross borders in favor of temporary shelter until a decision on asylum is reached. Identify current practices, gaps and flaws, and needed improvements.

- Protest against companies that produce and/or trade in “wall technologies,” from the simple ones (concrete) to complex ones, such as electronic devices used by border patrols.

- Letter Writing: An active campaign to write letters to governments to protest specific empirical cases of violations of human rights and environmental damage caused by wall building. The AAA could delegate specific responsibilities (e.g., to the AAA Committee for Human Rights) to write to relevant agencies within the U.S. government, Israel, and the EU
regarding violation. Alternatively, it could establish a new committee to monitor and protest such violations. Any letters should be posted to the AAA website. The Middle East Studies Association (MESA) is an example to follow in this regard.

3.2. International

Our members come from countries all around the world and as the anthropological organization with the greatest reach, we represent anthropology on a global scale. About 20 percent of AAA’s membership is based outside the United States.

- Encourage international organizations such as IOM, UN, ICRC to support the recognition of migration/mobility as a human right, not a crisis, or worse, a “problem.”
- Issue critical statements on walls and other governmental measures that inhibit free movement.
- AAA commitment to human rights should include actions and recommendations (AAA Committee on Walls/Borders and Human Health) on how to implement in a “post-pandemic world” a standardized international health criteria and non-discriminatory actions for all international travelers.
- Encourage cooperation among governments on both sides of a border, wall, fence or barrier to engage in constructive dialogue and implement procedures to prevent corruption, family separations, violations of international human rights, and ensure a humane policy on mobility, strength monitoring protocols (but not more surveillance) to ensure compliance with human rights laws and work towards accountability for transgressions by border officials.
- Encourage and fund more collaborative and comparative research
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